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ABSTRACT 
Adoption in New Zealand, and overseas, has undergone a significant transformation in recent 
years. While this has occurred on many fronts, the transformation that is of particular 
importance to this research paper is the proportionate increase in step-parent and intra-family 
adoption and the challenge this poses to traditional conceptions of adoption. 
In this research paper I have attempted to outline the current legal treatment of step-parent 
and intra-family adoption in New Zealand, contrasting or comparing it to the situation in 
overseas jurisdictions where appropriate. This has required a broad analysis of adoption in 
general, in order to place step-parent and intra-family adoption within a wider social , legal 
and philosophical framework . 
A recurring theme in this paper is the inadequacy of our current legislation to address the 
concerns of parties to step-parent and intra-family adoption. This is inevitable, given that the 
proportionate increase in step-parent and intra-family adoption is relatively recent, while the 
Adoption Act was passed almost 40 years ago. As a consequence, it is contended by many 
professionals involved in the adoption process that guardianship under the Guardianship Act 
1968 is generally a more appropriate legal response to step-parent and intra-family adoption 
applications. I have taken a different approach to this dilemma. Instead of accepting the two 
exclusive options of guardianship or adoption, I have sought to create a form of adoption that 
would meet the applicants' manifest demand for step-parent and intra-family adoption orders 
while simultaneously acknowledging concerns that vitiate against adoption in these situations. 
In particular, there is the concern that the child may be isolated from his or her family 
members or cultural heritage. In searching for an alternative adoption paradigm, I have relied 
upon recent and forthcoming developments to adoption law, and childcare law in general, in 
the United Kingdom, namely the Children Act 1989 and the White Paper 1993. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 16600 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In 1881 New Zealand became the first Commonwealth country to enact adoption legislation, 
with the passing of the Adoption of Children Act. 1 The Act sought to address the colony's 
problem of orphaned and illegitimate children by providing them with a permanent home. 
It aimed "to give care-givers greater security of tenure over children in their care and thus 
encourage people to take orphans, deserted and neglected children into their homes so that 
the children would cease to be a community responsibility and a charge on public funds ". 2 
By the 1940s social objectives had changed, and adoption came to be used for the dual 
purpose of providing infertile married couples with children to bring up as their own, and for 
solving the "problem" of unmarried mothers. Adopted children were provided with a 
permanent substitute family, and the fact of adoption was shrouded in secrecy. The secretive 
nature of adoption emanated from the stigma of both the child's illegitimacy and the adoptive 
parents' infertility. It was also greatly influenced by the desire to conform to society's "ideal" 
nuclear family prototype, under which parenthood is deemed to be an exclusive status. 3 
However, the use of adoption throughout the Western world has undergone a radical 
transformation since its inception, and the current Adoption Act 1955 is having to deal with 
issues that were not even contemplated when it was enacted. The most significant change to 
the practice of adoption is the "open" adoption movement, which acknowledges that it is often 
beneficial to maintain some degree of contact between the parties to adoption. This is of 
particular significance in light of the fact that, although the Adoption Act 1955 was framed 
with the traditional notion of "closed stranger" adoption in mind, since 1974 stranger 
adoptions have accounted for less than half of all adoptions:~ Instead, adoptions are 
occurring between children and adults who have had some kind of relationship before the 
2 
4 
Jenny Rocke! and Murray Ryburn point out in Adoption Today : Change and Choice in New Zealand 
(Heinemann Reed, Auckland. 1988) that the history of adoption in New Zealand actually originates with 
the Maori tradition of tamaiti whangai, the sharing of the care of children among members of the wider 
family. 
Re Application by Nana [1992) NZFLR 37. 41 per Judge Pethig. 
See Candace M Zierdt "Make New Parents But Keep the Old" (1993) 69 Nth Dakota LR 497, 503. 
Anne Else A Question of Adoption: Closed Stranger Adoption in New Zealand 1944 - 1974 (Bridget 
Williams Books Ltd, Wellington. 1991) xi. 
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adoption order is granted, and for whom "closed stranger" adoption is peculiarly unsuited. 
Step-parent and intra-family adoption are two such situations. 
In this paper I will examine the increased incidence of step-parent and intra-family adoptions, 
and the challenge they pose to the traditional paradigm of adoption as encapsulated in the 
Adoption Act 1955. I will outline why New Zealand and overseas jurisdictions are reluctant 
to uphold them as legitimate uses of the adoption process, and how the judiciary and 
legislature have sought to hamper their use. Finally, I will analyze the various reforms 
undertaken in overseas jurisdictions that have attempted to address concerns that arise in the 
context of step-parent and intra-family adoption, and highlight their relative merit or otherwise 
in the New Zealand context. 
II THE TRANSFORMATION OF ADOPTION 
Adoption today is a very different phenomenon to what it was when the notion of adoption 
was first introduced into Western legal systems. Firstly, there has been a dramatic decline 
in the incidence of adoption. In New Zealand in 1971 the number of children placed for 
adoption peaked at 3967. In 1991 a mere 806 adoptions took place.5 Similar trends are 
apparent in overseas jurisdictions. For instance, in the United Kingdom in 1989 7044 
adoption orders were made, as compared to 22502 in 1974.6 The decline in the incidence 
of adoption is directly related to the decrease in the number of babies available for adoption. 
This is attributable to an increased number of legal abortions,7 a decrease in the birth-rate,8 
more use of contraception, the availability of economic support for unmarried mothers since 
1973 from the Domestic Purposes Benefit, and greater social and legal9 tolerance of 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
All About Women in New Zealand (Department of Statistics, Wellington, 1993) 47. 
"Inter-Departmental Review of Adoption Law: The Adoption Process" (Department of Health. 
Heywood. 1990) 6. 
See Demographic Trends 1993 (Deparunent of Statistics, Wellington, 1994) 103, where Table 7.1 shows 
that the abortion ratio per 1000 live births occurring six months later was 71.2 in 1979, 137 .0 in I 985 
and 195.9 in 1992. 
Above n7, 33 Table 2.2 shows that the average number of births a woman would have during her 
reproductive Life in 1962 was 4.19, compared to 2.12 in 1992. 
1969 saw the enactment of the Status of Children Act, which removed legal discrimination to children 
born out of wedlock. 
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unmarried motherhood. 
In response to the fall in the number of babies available for adoption, the characteristics of 
adopted children have changed. Adopted children now tend to be older or have "special 
needs", often with a history of foster care. Inter-racial adoption was for a while utilised as 
an alternative source of adoptable children. However, widespread judicial and social 
condemnation has curtailed this practice. 10 Inter-country adoption has become increasingly 
popular as another means of addressing childlessness and infertility .11 
While these changes have been taking place, the nature of adoption has been undergoing a 
significant transformation. The notion of adoption as a "statutory guillotine" 12 has become 
increasingly obsolete, and in its place is an almost universal recognition of the merits of a 
more "open" form of adoption. 13 This open philosophy draws upon the findings of research 
undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s that examined the adoptee' s need for genealogical 
information. 14 The expression "genealogical bewilderment" was introduced to convey the 
distress displayed by people ignorant or confused about their origins. 15 Several prominent 
researchers believed that all adopted people experience a deep psychological need to know 
about their origins. 16 Such knowledge is often necessary so as not to handicap them in 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
For an example of the concerns expressed about inter-racial adoption see Martin Mears "Adoption. 
Bigotry and Race" (1990) 140 New U 564; or Kim Forde-Mazrin "Black Identity and Child Placement: 
The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children" (1994) 92 Michigan LR 925. In contrast, see New 
Zealand Adoption Council Newsleuer Issue 5, May/June 1994 (received from Mark Duke 25 August 
I 994, publisher and place of publication unknown) I, outlining recent moves in the United Kingdom 
and the United States to remove race as a determining consideration in adoption placements. 
For an example of recent legal commentary on the issue see Jennifer Home-Roberts "Intercountry 
Adoption" (1992) 142 New LJ 286; or Holly C Kennard "Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking of 
Children: A Discussion of the Hague Conference Convention in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions" 
(1994) 14 Uni of Pennsylvania J of International Business L 623. 
Re B(a minor)(adoption: jurisdiction) [1975) 2 AllER 449, 462 per Cumming-Bruce J. 
For a discussion of the possible disadvantages of open adoption placements, see Ruth G McRoy, Harold 
D Grotevant and Kerry L White Openness in Adoption: New Practices, New Issues (Praeger, New York. 
1988) 15 - 22. The authors point out that longitudinal research is required to determine and compare 
the outcomes of differing adoption practices. 
For instance, see John Triseliotis /11 Search of Origins: The Experience of Adopted People (Routledge 
& Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1973). 
John Triseliotis "Identity and Genealogy in Adopted People" in Euthymia D Hibbs (ed) Adoption: 
International Perspectives (International Universities Press, Madison, 1991) 35, 40. 
16 
Above nl5, 38. 
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developing essential parts of their identity. 17 
Those who reduce the adoptee's compelling need for his true identity to a mere 'curiosity' or 
a search for another and better mother, are cruelly unaware of this basic human need to be 
attached to one's true place in history. Obscuring the true identity of a person leaves him 
anonymous and unattached. no matter how many new names he may acquire. There is a 
profound psychological isolation in being unrelated to any other person who has ever lived and 
to be a stranger who never belongs wherever he may be. 
The concept of "social identity" has also been examined, with the underlying premise that 
adopted people have an intense need to know where they stand in relation to society. 18 Lack 
of genealogical knowledge has been directly linked to the frequent claim of adopted people, 
that they feel as if pieces are missing which interfere with their feeling complete or whole. 19 
Although early research in this field suggested that adopted people's need to know their 
genealogy was directly linked to unhappy adoptive relationships, more recent research has 
indicated that genealogical bewilderment is experienced by adopted people in many different 
stages of personal development.20 In particular, it can arise when adopted children retain 
some family connections, as often happens in step-parent and intra-family adoptions. "It is 
never a matter of mere biology, or mere history, but of the universal need to symbolise one's 
biology in one's constellation of past heritage and future life."21 
In response to the open adoption movement the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985 was 
17 KC Griffith "Adoption: Procedure, Documentation, Statistics: New Zealand 1881 - 1981, and Adult 
Adoptee Access to Information" (Wellington. 1981) 61, from paper presented by Dr Margaret M 
Lawrence to Annual Meeting, American Psychological Association, Washington DC, 1976. See also 
John Caldwell and Ken Daniels "Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Implications for Social Policy" 
in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) Family Law Policy in New Zealand (Oxford University Press. 
Auckland, 1992) 256, 261 where the authors point out that the experience of adopted children under 
the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985 is relevant to children born of assisted reproductive 
techniques. 
18 
Michael and Heather Humphrey Families with a Difference (Routledge, London, 1988) 76. 
19 
Above n 17, 64. This may account for the name given to the international organisation involved in 
assisting adopted people and birth parents in tracing their kin - JIGSAW. 
20 
Jillian Gay Kennard "Adoption Information: The Repossession of Identity" (thesis for MA (Applied) 
in Social Work, Victoria University of Wellington. 1991) 24 - 25. 
21 Above nl7, 64. 
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enacted in New Zealand.22 This statute allows adoptees aged twenty years or over and birth 
parents access to their adoption records held by Social Welfare. Social work practice has also 
been influenced, and social workers who participate in adoption placements now tend to adopt 
an informal open approach. 23 However, the Adoption Act 1955 has not been amended to 
recognise this philosophical shift, and open adoption in New Zealand remains beyond the 
purview of the law. In contrast, many overseas jurisdictions that previously shared the notion 
of adoption as involving the complete severance of relationships have since amended their 
relevant legislation to encompass a more open philosophy.24 
III PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE ADOPTION ACT 1955 
A LEGAL FICTION 
Adoption involves the substitution of new parents for the existing parents of a child. TI1is 
substitution is total: the existing parents cease in law to be parents of a child while the adoptees 
become his parents for all purposes, the child being deemed to have been born to them in lawful 
wedlock.25 
Traditionally, adoption has involved the fiction of pretending that an adopted child is no 
different from a biological child.26 This fictional quality stemmed from the premise of the 
nuclear family, and the idea of parenthood as an exclusive status.27 Given that only a third 
22 See Ann Corcoran "Opening of Adoption Records in New Zealand" in Euthymia D Hibbs (ed) 
Adoption: International Perspectives (International Universities Press, Madison, 1991) 223. 
23 Above nl, 162. 
24 Most of the Australian states have enacted open adoption legislation. Victoria was the first state to do 
so. Under the Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) adult adoptee are entitled to copies of their birth certificates 
as well as access to information contained in their adoption records, ss 92, 93. Natural parents. relatives 
and adoptive parents are also entitled to information in certain circumstances, ss95 - 98. 
25 Butteiworths Family Law Service Christine O'Brien (ed) 1994, p 7003, para 6.701. 
26 See sl6(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Adoption Act 1955. It is interesting to observe, however, that the 
complete substitution of relationships is not carried to its logical conclusion, because under sl6(2)(b) 
an exception is made with regard to incest or forbidden marriages, and under s16(2)(d) an exception 
is made with regard to any relevant deed. instrument. will or intestacy predating the adoption. For an 
opinion on intestacy rights with regard to step-parent adoptions, see Timothy Hughes "Intestate 
Succession and Step-parent Adoptions: Should Inheritance Rights of an Adopted Child be Determined 
by Blood or by Law?" [1988) Wise LR 321. 
27 
Above n3, 503. 
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of households in New Zealand in 1991 were two-parent, 28 it is apparent that this premise is 
now faulty, and our conception of parenthood needs re-examining. 
The legal fiction that adoption entails has been cited as the reason why adoption is 
inappropriate in step-parent and intra-family situations.29 Certainly it is arguable that the 
legal fiction of adoption requires particular scrutiny in the context of step-parent and intra-
family adoption, given that it may ignore the lives of the children involved, who may have 
experienced the breakup of their parents' marriage, or a parent's death, or may have spent 
some time living with only one parent or in an extended family situation. Alternatively, it 
may be argued that adoption recognises the social reality of these children's lives, that they 
now live in a reconstituted family with a new parent. In so far as step-parent adoptions are 
concerned, the almost imrnediate30 acquisition of parental status that an adoption order 
entails is particularly inappropriate, given that step-parent roles are "achieved" rather than 
"ascribed", and evolve gradually through negotiation in the settling down period of step-
farnilies. 31 However, as Mark Henaghan points out, arguments about the fictional nature of 
adoption "are not a one-way street" ,32 and can be used in support of some step-parent 
adoption applications. Also, it is salient to keep in mind that all adoptions are based on a 
fiction. "Either we abandon adoption because of its fictional nature, or we accept the fiction 
is necessary for the security of a child in particular situations".33 
B SECRECY 
The secret nature of adoption proceedings is apparent in the legal consequences of adoption , 
which ensure that the child's identity is exclusively linked to the adoptive parents. Under 
28 Above n5, 39. 
29 
See Adoption Practices Review Committee "Report to the Minister of Social Welfare" (Wellington. 
30 
31 
32 
33 
I 990) 62 and 64. 
Under s5 of the Adoption Act interim orders are in most circumstances made in the first instance. if 
the Court considers that the application should be granted. Section 13(2) specifies a 6 month period 
as the norm. 
Gay Ochiltree Children in Step/amities (Prentice Hall, Victoria, 1990) 145. 
Mark Henaghan "Legally Rearranging Families" in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) Family Law 
Policy in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) 83, 147. 
Mark Henaghan and Pauline Tapp "Legally Defining the Family" in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin 
(eds) Family Law Policy in New Zealand (Oxford University Press. Auckland. 1992) I. 21. 
7 
Section 16( 1) of the Adoption Act the adopted child is conferred the surname of the adoptive 
parents. Section 21(3)(b) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1951 provides for the re-
registration of the birth, which under Section 21(3)(c) does not describe the adoptive parents 
as such. Sections 21 (7), 21 (8) and 21 (9) prevent access to the original birth certificate, 
though this is lessened somewhat by the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985. 
Access to the original birth certificate of adoptees was initially restricted in New Zealand to 
protect the adoptees from the stigma of illegitimacy. In the 1960s a member of the English 
judiciary described the policy as such:34 
In general, it is the policy of the law to make the veil between past and present lives of adopted 
persons as opaque and impenetrable as possible, like the veil which God has placed between 
the living and the dead. 
Social and legal convention no longer rests upon notions of illegitimacy, and secrecy can no 
longer be argued for under this heading. 
Following the trend in overseas jurisdictions, some members of the New Zealand judiciary 
and professionals involved in the adoption process have shown favour for moving away from 
a secretive regime, and instead enacting an open adoption process.35 In 1990 the Adoption 
Practices Review Committee reported to the Minister of Social Welfare that endorsement of 
open adoption was "overwhelming", and that "legislative reform in this area is urgent". 36 
The reasons given for this endorsement are varied. Firstly, open adoption is consistent with 
Maori and Pacific Island attitudes to adoption. 37 Secondly, open adoption does appear to 
34 Above nl7, 46. 
35 See W v Director-General of Social Welfare ( 1991) 8 FRNZ 450, 469 per Judge MacConnick; see also 
above n25, p 7003. para 6.701. The decision of the Court of Appeal in In the Guardianship of J (1983) 
2 NZFLR 314 directly broached the issue of open adoption. Although Cooke J commented that "[t]he 
open adoption solution is somewhat novel in this country and has its dangers" he thought that the child 
would benefit more from being adopted in an open setting than from remaining in the grandparents' 
custody. 
36 Above n22. 40 - 41. 
37 See above nl3, 23, where it is pointed out that. in the United States. despite the fact that the traditional 
practice of adoption in old Hawaii. hanai. provides a role model for open placements, hanai is in fact 
"so remote from the United States adoption experience. where the emphasis is on individual 
responsibility and achievement. that the concept is not directly transferable to United States adoption 
8 
benefit all parties to the relationship more than a closed, secretive regime. It benefits the 
adopted child in that it avoids the many complications of a secretive and confidential 
adoption, among them the nurturing of unhealthy fantasies, the creation of stress, anxiety, 
fears and obsessions, and the inducement of guilt. 38 It may also assist the child to form a 
positive mental image of his or her birth parents, though likewise it may make problematic 
situations more difficult to convey to the child, for instance incest or prostitution.39 Most 
importantly, adopted children benefit because they are not denied knowledge of their 
biological heritage, and, for those children who are older and have already formed 
relationships with family members who will be excluded by the adoption order, because they 
will be able to retain these relationships. Continued contact also helps birth mothers in 
coping with the grief of losing a child, openness giving tangibility to the loss of the child so 
that it can be grieved for and the loss resolved:rn Openness also reassures birth parents by 
allowing them the opportunity to offer the child something, in particular information about 
his or her origins, and by knowing about their child's life and wellbeing.41 Research has 
shown that adoptive parents benefit too, due to the fact that successful adoptions require 
adoptive parents to accept the difference between parenting adoptive and biological 
children.42 Fears that adoptive parents may have about losing their child appear to be 
unwarranted, given that the adoptive parents remain the child's only pschological parents.43 
In recognition of the advantages children can gain from an open adoption regime, the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child enshrines an open philosophy.44 
38 
practice". This same observation may be applicable in New Zealand with regards to traditional Maori 
adoption. 
Above nl7, 50. See also Nancy Verrier The Primal Wou11d: Understanding the Adopted Child 
(Gateway Press, Baltimore, 1993), wherein Verrier asserts that adopted children will always suffer from 
the experience of being separated from their birth mother, irrespective of the type of adoption that 
occurs thereafter. 
39 Above nl3, 115. 
40 
See David Howe, Phillida Sawbridge and Diana Hinings Half A Million Wome11: Mothers Who Lose 
Their Children by Adoption (Penguin Group, London, 1992) which examines, from the birth mother's 
point of view, all the experiences of giving up a child for adoption; see also Maureen A Sweeney 
"Between Sorrow and Happy Endings: A New Paradigm of Adoption" (1990) 2 Yale J of Law and 
Feminism 329. 
41 Above nl, 163 - 164. 
42 
Jennifer Home-Roberts "The Adoption Law Review" (1991) 141 New U 1657. 
43 
Above nl, 164. 
44 
Article 7 of the Convention ays that the child shall have the right to know and be cared for by his or 
her parents, and Article 9 provides that if a child is separated from his or her natural parents. the child 
has the right to maintain personal relations and direct contact on a personal basis. Article 21 directly 
9 
C PERMANENCE 
Once an adoption order has been granted it is practically irreversible. Variation or discharge 
under Section 27 require the prior approval of the Attorney-General, and that the adoption 
was made by a mistake as to a material fact or representation. Given that the fundamental 
aim of adoption is to provide children with a permanent home,45 it is only fitting that the 
court's powers to vary or discharge an adoption order are very limited. 
Care, however, must be taken not to constrain the worthy notion of permanency. Of 
particular relevance here is Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's notorious book Beyond the Best 
Interests of the Child, published in 1973. The authors found that children's ability to develop 
strong emotional attachments does not rely on biological relationships. The adult who "on 
a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, 
fulfils the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs" was 
called the "psychological parent".46 When the child's custody was at issue, the perceived 
risk of the child being harmed by conflicting parental loyalties, and thereby undermining the 
child's sense of stability, led to the practice of terminating parent/child relationships and 
granting sole control over the child to only one psychological parent:n In cases of step-
parent and intra-family adoption, the child's day-to-day caretaker (perhaps a step-parent, or 
grandparent) was likely to have an adoption order granted in his or her favour, while the 
child's noncustodial biological parent was likely to have his or her legal relationship with the 
child terminated. This practice stands in stark contrast to current notions of open adoption. 
The "psychological parent" principle, however, can be used to support the continuation of 
parent/child relationships, if it is accepted that continuity of relationships need not undermine, 
addresses adoption; it mandates that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration. 
that adoption must be authorized by competent authorities, and that persons concerned must have given 
their informed consent. See Graeme Austin "The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
- and Domestic Law" (1994) 1 Butterworths Fam LJ 63 and 87. 
45 See above n42, 1657, where the author points out that adoption law in Australia. New Zealand, Canada 
and the United Kingdom is based on the same concept of adoption, "ie the provision of a permanent 
home for the child". 
46 
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert J Solnit Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (The Free 
Press, New York, 1973) 98. 
47 
Above n3, 501 - 502. 
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and indeed may well enhance, the provision of permanent, stable homes for children. 
D INFLEXIBLE 
Adoption has been described as a "package deal", in that "[a]ll of the legal consequences ... 
flow automatically from it without any room for adjustment to meet the particular wishes or 
needs of the parties in individual cases".48 This defect of the law gains heightened 
significance in the context of step-parent and intra-family adoption, where legal consequences 
designed for infant adoption by strangers are unlikely to always be appropriate. 
E CHIW'S WELFARE AND INTERESTS 
Under Section 11 the Court must be satisfied that several conditions have been met before 
granting an adoption order, and one of these is that the welfare and interests of the child will 
be promoted by the adoption.49 It is apparent that those who framed the 1955 Act did not 
intend the interests of the child to supersede parental rights, given that legislation in existence 
before the 1955 Act expressed this principle to be paramount.50 However, since the decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Director-General of Social Welfare v L51 in 1990 it has been 
established that once a ground exists for the Court to dispense with the parent's consent the 
guiding principle in the exercise of the Court's discretion is the interests and welfare of the 
child. Richardson J went further than this to suggest that, because adoption necessarily 
involves issues of guardianship and custody, and because the child's welfare is the paramount 
principle of the Guardianship Act 1968,52 then it should also be the paramount consideration 
in an adoption order.53 This view is supported by Article 21 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which mandates that the best interests of the child 
48 lain Johnston "ls Adoption Outmoded?" (I 985) 6 Otago LR 15, 23. 
49 Section 1 l(b). 
50 See above n48, 18 - one such statute was the Infants Act 1908 as amended by the Guardianship of 
Infants Act 1926. 
51 [1990] NZFLR 125. 
52 Section 23(1) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
53 
Above n5 l, 129 per Richardson J. See also Mark Henaghan "Welfare and Interests of the Child: 
Adoption Proceedings" ( 1990) 2 Family L Bulletin 86. 
11 
shall be the paramount consideration in adoption.54 
Whether or not an adoption order will be in the child's welfare and interests will depend upon 
the individual facts of the case. However, infrequently ideological concerns will permeate 
the substance of a judicial decision or adoption policy.55 The question of whether or not the 
institution of adoption itself is advantageous to children tends to be a matter of anecdote and 
conjecture.56 In New Zealand a team of researchers headed by Professor Fergusson have 
been involved in this country's only longitudinal empirical study of adopted children. This 
research has involved, among other things, a comparison of the home environment, cognitive 
and social adjustment of children placed respectively in two parent, single parent and adoptive 
families. The conclusions drawn after 12 years of the study, in preparation for the Adoption 
Practices Review Committee report of 1990, was that children placed for adoption were the 
most advantaged group in terms of quality of home environment, while those placed in single 
parent families were the most disadvantaged.57 It was also concluded that, although only 
single parent children fared significantly less well on measures of cognitive ability and 
achievement, both single parent and adoptive children fared significantly less well than two 
parent children on measures of conduct disorder and attention deficits.58 When 
environmental factors were taken into account statistically, adopted children fared less well 
than children in single parent families with regards to conduct disorder and attention deficits. 
Furthermore, the scores of adopted children on measures of cognitive ability and adjustment 
were slightly poorer than those children in two parent families. 59 Despite these seemingly 
adverse results, however, the general conclusion was that for the children in this study, 
adoption was more advantageous than disadvantageous.60 While specifying that the findings 
54 
55 
56 
See also above nlO, 4, wherein it is pointed out that the reference to "the protection of children" in the 
formal title of the Hague Convention suggests that the international community has determined that the 
primary purpose of adoption in the current era is to be child-focused. 
Compare current concerns on inter-racial adoption, above n 10. with a proposed amendment to the law 
of adoption in the United Kingdom in the White Paper. below n229, p9 para 4.32, which emphasises 
that ethnicity and culture should not necessarily be any more influential than other considerations. 
For instance, see "Call to Ban 'Cruel' Adoptions" Sunday Star-Times Auckland, New Zealand, 25 June 
1994, 5. 
57 D M Fergusson "The Outcomes of Adoption: A 12 Year Longitudinal Study" (Christchurch Child 
Development Study Paper, Prepared for the Adoption Review Committee, 1990). 
58 Above n57, 12. 
59 
Above n57, 15. 
60 
Above n57, 19. 
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of the study were not intended "as a basis for sweeping generalisations about the desirability 
or undesirability of adoption", the report points out that "adoption has a place as a means of 
protecting the interests of the child".61 This view is reflected in the statement of Dr John 
Triseliotis at the International Conference on Adoption in 1991 :62 
There are strong pressures here and in other countries to see the abolition of adoption for the 
wrong reasons. This should be resisted. Adoption will phase itself out when every child can 
live with its own family, and in its own country, thus maintaining continuity and stability. This 
provision has not yet been reached. Its discouragement could prove detrimental to many 
children who would be condemned to a life of rootlessness for ideological reasons. 
Despite judicial emphasis on the welfare and interests of the child, the adult-centred approach 
of adoption law is continually criticised, particularly in light of the increasing incidence of 
orders granting adoptions to step-parents and family members.63 Anne Else points out that, 
"[d]espite repeated claims that it centres on the needs and welfare of children, adoption is 
really about adult beliefs and desires and dilemmas".64 
IV STEP-PARENT AND INTRA-FAMILY ADOPTION: 
JEOPARDISING THE CHILD'S WELFARE AND INTERESTS? 
Step-parent and intra-family adoption are suggestive of a trend away from the "total 
transplant" concept of adoption.65 Because in these situations it is often thought to be in the 
child's best interests to maintain some form of contact with the biological parent and family 
members, these adoptions pose a challenge to the current legal framework which facilitates 
complete severance and transference of relationships. The general consensus of academics, 
6 1 
Above n57, 20. 
62 Above n 10, 2. 
63 
Caroline Bridge "Changing the Nature of Adoption: Law Reform in England and New Zealand" (1993) 
64 
65 
13 Legal Studies 81. 82. Both of the lawyers that I interviewed, Vicky Hammond on 5 September 1994 
and Tony Walsh on 8 August 1994, were concerned, from their own experiences. that step-parent and 
intra-family adoptions tend to be motivated by adults' interests. 
Above n4, xiii. 
"Inter-Departmental Review of Adoption Law: The Nature and Effect of Adoption" (Department of 
Health. Heywood. 1990) 5. 
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lawyers, and other professionals working in the adoption arena, 1s that adoption is often 
inappropriate in step-parent and intra-family situations.66 
It is important to keep in mind that, despite this reluctance to encourage step-parent and intra-
family adoptions, they are a common phenomenon. It is also important to keep in mind that 
very little writing or research has looked into the parties' attitudes and experiences, thereby 
substantiating these adverse assumptions.67 Given the fact that the historic disapproval of 
step-parent and intra-family adoption has little empirical basis, goes against public demand, 
and has never benefitted from informed public debate, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
some form of social engineering underlies the issue. Mary Ann Glendon presupposes this 
likelihood when she says that "[m]uch of family law is no more - and no less - than the 
symbolic expression of certain cultural ideals" .68 
A STEP-PARENT ADOPTION 
Step-parent adoptions as a proportion of all adoptions have increased markedly in recent 
years. They usually involve the mother and step-father applying to adopt the mother's natural 
child. In 1963, of the 1258 adoptions handled by the Department of Social Welfare 16.28 per 
cent were by one parent and spouse,69 while in 1992, of the 694 cases handled by Social 
Welfare 40.3 per cent were by one parent and spouse.70 Step-parent adoption is assuming 
similar significance in overseas jurisdictions. For instance, in the United Kingdom in 1983 
66 For instance, of my conversations with five professionals involved in the adoption process, the 
unanimous opinion was that generally step-parent and intra-family adoption is inappropriate. 
67 See "Inter-Departmental Review of Adoption Law: Review of Research Relating to Adoption" 
(Department of Health, Heywood, 1990) 76, where the author says that, given the large proportion of 
step-parent and relative adoption applications, "there is remarkably little written on the subject". See 
also above n65, 26, where it is pointed out that the Houghton Committee that in 1972 looked into 
adoption in the United Kingdom was criticised for basing its recommendations on step-parent adoption 
on anecdotal evidence. 
68 Mary Ann Glendon Abortion and Divorce in Western Law: American Failures , European Challenges 
(Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1987) 10. 
69 "Adoption Act 1955: A Review by an Interdepartmental Working Party" (Department of Justice and 
Department of Social Welfare. Wellington, 1987) l l. 
70 
New Zealand Official Yearbook 1994 (97ed, Department of Statistics, Wellington, 1994) 155. In fact, 
in 1992 there were 794 final adoption orders made, but only 694 of these were handled by or reported 
to the Children and Young Persons Service. 
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step-parent adoptions constituted 31.8 per cent of all adoptions.71 In New Zealand these 
adoptions are provided for under Section 3 of the Adoption Act 1955, which says that an 
adoption order may be made in respect of the adoption of a child by a parent of the child 
jointly with his or her spouse. Interestingly enough, despite the controversy surrounding step-
parent adoptions, under Section 10 of the Act they are exempt from the usual requirement of 
a social worker's report. 72 
In 1990 the Adoption Practices Review Committee suggested various motives for step-parent 
adoptions.73 These included a genuine attempt to formalise a de facto situation; that the 
natural parent may be dead, unknown or disappeared, and adoption gives the child a legal 
parent while severing the link to the other parent; or that adoption may express the step-
parents full acceptance of the child as part of a newly-constructed family. Another motive 
that has been found to be influential is the fact that the child's surname changes upon being 
adopted, with adoption applications often coinciding with the child's school enrolment.74 
Step-parent adoptions may also result from applicants fixing upon adoption as "the thing to 
do", and wanting to make the family feel like a "proper family", often with very little idea 
of the consequences or implications.75 A necessary corollary to most of these motives is the 
fact that it is often the biological mother who is (assumed to be) the moving force behind 
step-parent adoptions.76 Due recognition must therefore be paid to the social pressures 
unique to a patriarchal society that underlie step-parent adoptions. Susan Maidment believes 
that women who have just remarried are under great pressure to weigh the balance in favour 
of their new family, which involves changing the child's surname and adopting the child with 
the step-father.77 In the context of surname change, the underlying dynamics of patriarchy 
71 Above n65. 16. 
72 
For criticism of this statutory provision (or Jack thereof) see W v S (1987) 4 NZFLR 659 per Judge 
Pethig. 
73 Above n22, 62. 
74 
David L Chambers "Step-parents, Biologic Parents. and the Law's Perceptions of 'Family' after 
Divorce" in Stephen D Sugarman and Henna Hill Kay (eds) Divorce Reform at the Crossroads (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1990) 102, 120. 
75 Above n65, 17. 
76 
Judith Masson "Step-parent Adoptions" in Philip Bean (ed) Adoptioll: Essays ill Social Policy, Law. alld 
77 
Sociology (Tavistock Publications, New York, 1984) 146, 147. 
Susan Maidment "Step-parents and Step-children: Legal Relationships in Serial Unions" in John M 
Eekelaar and Sanford N Katz (eds) Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies: Areas of 
Legal , Social and Ethical Change (Butterworths, Toronto, 1980) 420, 434. 
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are patently obvious, as has been pointed out by one learned Judge:78 
If a woman, on marriage, adopts for herself her first husband's name, and for herself and for 
her children, the names of subsequent husbands, both legal and de facto, she is voluntarily 
perpetuating the patriarchal society to which objection is taken. 
Despite the fact that distressingly little is known about step-parent adoptions, commentators 
tend to consider step-parent adoptions inappropriate. Adoption has been described as an 
"inaccurate expression" in the step-parent context, given that the child infrequently acquires 
an additional rather than a substitute parent.79 It is thought that step-parent adoptions are 
frequently made to satisfy adults' own needs and insecurities.80 A number of malevolent 
motives for step-parent adoptions have been proposed, for instance step-parent adoption may 
be used as a trade-off in the winding up of a marriage.81 
[T]he real motive may [also] be to make the applicants' own lives more comfortable by shutting 
out the non-custodial natural parent altogether, or to enable them to conceal the fact of a failed 
former marriage by presenting their family to the world as a natural one rather than a 
reconstituted one, or even to hurt the other parent. 
Step-parent adoptions have been criticised for allowing children, after the breakdown of a 
marriage, to be "reshuffled and dealt out like a pack of cards".82 The analogy with card-
playing could, however, be applied in many situations of marital breakdown, irrespective of 
whether or not adoption occurs. Indeed, in situations of step-parent adoption it could be 
contended that the reshuffling has already occurred, and the adoption is putting into place 
permanent arrangements. A further criticism is that, in so far as adoption is meant to provide 
a child with a secure home and upbringing, the high rate of divorce in second marriages 
78 
Putrino and Jackson (1978) FLC 90-441 per Lusink J. Mark Duke (written correspondence 25 August 
1994) believes that the change of surname is not unhealthy, as it happens also in marriage situations. 
Mary Ivanek (interview 6 September 1994) believes that concerns about changing a child's name, and 
indirectly a child's past, can be rectified by using hypenated surnames. 
79 Above n25, p 7032, para 6.708. However, this may depend upon the facts, for instance if the natural 
father is unknown then the step-father will in fact be a substitute rather than additional parent. 
80 Dolly Stevenson "The New Style of Adoption" (1988) I Family L Bulletin 168, 17 l. 
81 Above n25, p 7030, para 6.708. 
82 
Re B [1975] 2 AUER 449,462 per Cumming-Bruce J. 
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makes security problematic.83 Concern has also been expressed with the fact that no 
tangible benefits arise from step-parent adoptions84 • and that if the adoption is not granted 
the child will not necessarily be disadvantaged.85 
It is doubtful if the kind of man who is willing to adopt his wife's children would be any less 
conscientious in his behaviour toward the children without the legal sanction of adoption. 
Due recognition must be given, however, to those situations where step-parent adoptions are 
genuinely made in the best interests of the child involved. This is most likely to be the case 
where the step-parent has assumed a parent role for many years, or since the child was very 
young, and the child has never had a relationship with his or her non-custodial biological 
parent. Cases that justify an adoption order, however, are not limited to these circumstances 
alone. Blanket disapproval of step-parent adoption fails to take into account those cases 
where adoption is the only, or is the most effective, means of addressing the parties' needs. 
The apparent reluctance of some commentators to make concessions suggests an inherent 
inconsistency in current adoption theory, given that a more flexible adoption regime is 
advocated in almost all other respects.86 Perhaps the issue of step-parent adoption requires 
a closer examination of the actual phenomenon of step-parenthood, in order to discover why 
such resolute attitudes exist. 
83 
8-4 
85 
86 
Although the 1990 Adoption Practices Review Committee report expressed the breakdown of second 
marriages as a reason for querying step-parent adoptions, above n29, 62, no New Zealand statistics exist 
to substantiate this claim. However, proportionately higher divorce rates of second marriages are found 
in Australia - see above n31, 4; in the United Kingdom - see Frank F Furstenberg Jr ,md Andrew J 
Cherlin Divided Families: What Happens to Children when Parents Part (Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge, 1991) 87; and in the United States of America - see Kathleen M Lynch "Adoption: Can 
Adoptive Parents Change Their Minds?" (1992/1993) 26 Family L Quarterly 257. 260. Furstenberg and 
Cherlin suggest that the absence of cultural guidelines and the added stress of building durable 
emotional ties to step-children makes step-families less stable, 87. 
See Re S (infants) ( adoption by parent) [ 1977] 3 AUER 671, 675 per Onnrod LJ (CA). See also 
Whiuaker v Hancox [1991] NZFLR 328, 333 per Judge Keane. However, due account must be taken 
of the fact that children adopted by step-parents may benefit under the laws of succession (see Re 
Adoption of A [1992] NZFLR 422), immigration (see Re Application by Nana [1992] NZLFR 37) and 
child support, among others. Keith Griffith (interview 26 July 1994) believes that a tangible benefit 
arises if an adult is a proven threat to the child. 
Above n74, 120. fn 62, from Jessie Bernard Remarried: A Study of Marriage (2nd ed. 1971) (unable 
to locate original source). 
See WR Atkin "New Zealand: Children Versus Families - is there any Conflict?" (1988/1989) 27 J of 
Family Law 231. 240. 
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Step-families, though not new, are becoming a more frequent occurrence. Because census 
records do not identify step-relationships it is difficult to ascertain their actual magnitude. 
However, in the United Kingdom it has been estimated that about one fourth of all children 
born in the early 1980s will live in a step-family before they become adults.87 Difficulties 
arise when one seeks to define a step-family. Step-families have been described as "the most 
complex and heterogeneous form of the family", in which the psychological and physical 
boundaries are less clear than in "intact" families.88 Consequently, step-parenthood is a 
nebulous concept. It has been described as "a special kind of fosterage with no enduring 
rights or responsibilities".89 The uncertainty surrounding the concept of step-parenthood, and 
the corresponding lack of cultural guidelines, may be a contributing factor to the high divorce 
rate of second marriages.90 It also makes it more difficult to prescribe the legal position of 
step-relationships, which unlike biological relationships, have no established paradigm.91 
As well as being uncertain, the history of step-parenthood is shrouded in negative 
connotations. From the age old tale of Cinderella to the modem day spectre of the abusive 
step-parent, step-parenthood receives unflattering descriptions in popular culture.92 Brenda 
Maddox provides an intriguing insight into these negative overtones by recounting the origins 
of the "step" prefix.93 
The link with death is old and undeniable. All the step- words trace their origin to the Old 
English steop-, which is linked with words for bereavement. A stepchild was a steopbearn, an 
orphan; a stepparent, the new spouse of a widowed parent. The original association, therefore, 
87 Above n74, 102. 
88 Above n31, 145 - 146. 
89 Frank F Furstenberg Jr and Andrew J Cherlin Divided Families : What Happens 10 Children when 
Parents Part (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991) 80. Note that in New Zealand. the only 
statute that imposes a liability on a step-parent is the Child Support Act 1991, but that is only if a s99 
declaration is made. 
90 See above n83. 
91 "Step-parent" has been held to include a spouse who accepts and maintains within the family the 
children of the other spouse of an adulterous relationship, see B v W and R (Family Court, Whakatane 
FP 087/113/91, 20 May 1992). 
92 See Brenda Maddox The Half-Parent : Living with Other People's Children (Andre Deutsch Ltd, 
London, 1975) 143, where the author says that tales of the wicked step-parent flourish in monogamous 
societies. 
93 Above n92, 34. 
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is with the greatest pain a child can experience, the loss of a parent and the loss of the central 
place in the surviving parent 's affecuons. 
Maddox continues. 
In an oblique way, the overtones of rejection carried by the step- prefixes are accentuated, I 
think, by the ordinary meaning of the word "step": a step away, one step removed. TI1e word 
" tepparent" suggests somebody who is a step in clistance from the child and a degree less 
loving, less committed, than a natural parent. 
It is, perhaps, unsurpnsmg that, given the history of step-relationships, and the 
(mis)conceptions that surround step-parenthood today,94 step-parent adoption has not been 
condoned, or indeed even accepted, in modern society. In New Zealand guardianship under 
the Guardianship Act 1968 has been touted as the most accurate legal expression of step-
parenthood.95 However, it could also be contended that adoption in fact confirms the social 
reality of the child's life, and is therefore a more accurate legal expression of the situation 
than guardianship. Obviously in practice many step-families are not satisfied, or do not 
believe that they will be satisfied, with a guardianship order,96 and are instead applying for 
adoption.97 The time has come for the law to redress its current inattention of step-families, 
and to seek to meet the respective needs and concerns of parties to step-parent adoption. 
B INTRA-FAMILY ADOPTION 
Like step-parent adoption, intra-family adoption has become an increasingly common form 
of adoption. In 1992, 23.2 per cent of adoptions that were handled by Social Welfare were 
94 
See above n89, 89, where the authors conclude from their research that there is no reason why step-
families should not be encouraged. with children growing up in step-families having the same frequency 
of problems as children from single-parent families, and an only slightly higher risk of encountering 
problems relative to children growing up with two biological parents. 
95 Above n25, p 7032, para 6.708. 
96 
When I discussed this issue with Vicky Hammond (interview 5 September 1994) she expressed concern 
97 
that people are of ten "hung up" on labels. for instance on derogatory connotations associated with 
guardianship, rather than simply accepting that guardianship can offer them all that they desire. 
See below pp 35 - 39 for further discussion of guardianship. 
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by relatives,98 compared to 7.54 per cent in 1963.99 While intra-family adoption is not 
expressly referred to in the Act, it is implicit in its provisions that relatives - defined as 
grandparents, aunts and uncles, and siblings - may adopt a child.100 
Little is known about how children who are adopted by their relatives, informally or formally, 
fare, though there has been research that suggests children cared for by relatives do well.101 
This is highly plausible given that children fostered by relatives tend to do well, 102 which 
may be due to the fact that such placements are usually made by the child's natural parents, 
are generally intended as longterm, and therefore the child is less likely to feel unsure or 
anxious about his or her status.103 
Nonetheless, intra-family adoption is actively discouraged by many professionals working in 
the adoption arena. The 1987 Review by an Interdepartmental Working Party on the 
Adoption Act 1955 recommended that relative adoption be prohibited because it extinguishes 
the child's legal relationships on one side of the family, while distorting natural relationships 
on the other side of the family. 104 The Houghton Committee that looked into adoption in 
the United Kingdom in 1972 was similarly concerned, pointing out that if the real 
circumstances were hidden from children, their discovery of them later may be very 
damaging.1°5 For instance, a child may discover that his or her "parents" are really 
grandparents, and an older "sister" is in fact his or her mother. For these reasons intra-family 
adoption is generally thought to be inappropriate. Jenny Rocke! and Murray Ryburn believe 
that the only situation in which it should be condoned is when the birth parent who will be 
excluded by the adoption has never played any part in the child's life, and where the child 
98 
Above n70, 155. 
99 Above n69, 11. 
100 
The provision that defines "relatives", s2, specifies that they may be of the full blood, half blood, or 
by affinity. The only provision that expressly refers to relative adoption is s4(1)(b), which says that 
if the applicant is a relative of the child, the applicant need only be 20, rather than the usual mandatory 
25, years of age. 
101 
Robert LudbrookAdoption: Guide to Law and Practice (Government Printing Office, Wellington, 1990) 
11. 
102 Jane Rowe et al (eds) Long Term Foster Care (Batsford Academic & Educational, London, 1984) 175. 
103 
Above nl02, 176 - 180. 
104 
Above n69, 12. 
105 
Above n65, 27 - 28. 
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is old enough to understand the full meaning of the adoption and has a strong wish to be 
adopted in order to strengthen his or her sense of belonging. 106 
Intra-family adoption is important for two reasons. Firstly, in a population that is increasingly 
aged, and where families are increasingly likely to be headed by either a sole-parent or two 
working parents, grandparents are increasingly assuming child-rearing responsibilities. 107 
Secondly, intra-family adoption is of particular relevance to Maori people. Traditional Maori 
adoption 108 incorporates the Maori notion of communal rather than individual responsibility 
for children. As Joan Metge has pointed out, "[w]hen Maori talk about "our children" they 
mean not "a mama tamariki" (the children of us two) but "a matou tamariki" (the children of 
us many). 109 This notion of communal responsibility for children is reflected in the Maori 
concept of adoption or fostering, both of which mean the same thing. An adopted child is 
referred to as tamaiti whangai, tamaiti meaning "child", and whangai meaning "the feeding 
and nurturing of body, mind and spirit". 110 Tamaiti whangai encompasses all situations 
where a child is cared for by adults other than parents for a significant period. The reasons 
why this is done are numerous. m 
They did it to relieve stress on their own family unit; to provide companionship for someone 
living alone; to comfort a childless couple or a family mourning the loss of a child; to 
strengthen links with the extended family; to provide a mokai - another pair of bands - for a 
family undertaking. In the context of Maori culture, perhaps the most significant reason for 
adoption was the wish to pass knowledge from one generation to another. Placing a child (often 
the mataamua or first-born) with an older family member ... was an accepted means of passing 
on the wisdom, crafts and customs of the tribe. 
106 Above nl, 186. 
107 
See John Caldwell "Grandparents: Access, Custody and Adoption" [1994] 1 Butterworths Family LJ 
69, where he admits there is no published study of grandparenting in New Zealand, but anticipates that 
New Zealand will follow American trends in this respect. 
108 
Joan Metge points out in above n4, 176 that traditional Maori adoption is relatively common in Maori 
families and communities, but adds that "she is outlining 'the ideal pattern rather than actual behaviour, 
and that Maori, like other cultural groups, do not always live up to the generally accepted ideal'". 
109 Above n4, 175. 
110 Above nl, 5. 
111 Above nl, 5. 
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Rather than shrouding the fact of adoption in secrecy, Maori adoption is very open about who 
the child's biological parents and relatives are. Indeed, this is an essential component of a 
process which has as one of its twin beliefs that knowing and valuing ancestral origins is the 
foundation of individual and cultural identity. 112 Puao-te-ata-tu, the report undertaken by 
a Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori perspective for the Department of Social 
Welfare, alludes to this when it says that "[t]he physical, social and spiritual wellbeing of a 
Maori child is inextricably related to the sense of belonging to a wider whanau group". 11 3 
The other belief which lies at the heart of the Maori adoption model recognizes the value of 
children's whakapapa in linking their own and their culture's past and present. 114 
The Adoption Act 1955 is the only family statute in New Zealand that flagrantly rejects 
Maori beliefs and practices. While previous adoption statutes had recognised the Maori 
practice of adoption,"5 the 1955 Act was passed during a political era of assimilation 
policy, and was "aimed at making Maori abandon their distinctive tikanga and conform to the 
economic and social patterns of the non-Maori majority". " 6 The Adoption Act, as it has 
traditionally operated and been perceived, is alien to notions of Maori kinship and history. 
Because descent is so important in establishing the identity of the individual and the tribe, 
Maori do not approve of complete severance of legal relationships. Neither do they feel the 
need to sever existing relationships because, under a system of communal responsibility for 
children, "natural parents do not constitute a threat to the adoptive parents but step easily into 
the role of supplementary care-givers, especially when adoption takes place within the 
whanau". 117 When adoption takes place outside the whanau, it is approved of only if the 
adoptive parents show an appreciation of the significance of the child's cultural heritage. 
Generally, however, Maori prefer adoptive parents to be relatives of the child. 118 
112 Above nl, 6. 
113 
Puao-te-ata-tu (Day Break): The Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective 
for the Department of Social Welfare (Wellington, 1986) 30. 
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Given that the genealogy of tamariki whangai is not shrouded in secrecy, the argument that 
natural relationships are distorted is redundant. 119 Similarly, the argument that it may not 
be in the child's best interests to be adopted by relatives is dispelled, given that Maori agree 
the child's welfare and interests should be the paramount consideration in all adoption 
applications. 120 What they do question, however, is the way in which the child's welfare 
and interests have been determined in the past. 
V JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE ADOPTION ACT 1955 
ln recent years, the judiciary have attempted to interpret and apply the provisions of the 
Adoption Act in a manner consistent with the practical and philosophical developments 
affecting adoption. In keeping with the idea that the law expresses current values, the 
judiciary have at times taken a different approach to step-parent and intra-family adoption 
than to other adoption situations. 
A DISPENSING WITH PARENTAL CONSENT 
Under Section 7 of the Adoption Act, an adoption order cannot be made unless all of those 
whose consent is required has been obtained. Thus the consent of the spouse of any sole 
applicant is always required, as is the consent of the mother, but only upon the child attaining 
ten days old. The father's consent is only required if he was married to the mother at the 
time of the child's birth or at or after the time of the child's conception, or if the father is a 
guardian of the child. The court may also require the father's consent if it is "expedient" to 
do so. 121 
If an adoption order 1s applied for, and the natural parent who will be excluded by the 
119 
For an example of this argument being overridden in a non-Maori relative adoption situation, see M v 
Kendall (1992] NZFLR 63 per Smeltie J. Vicky Hmnmond (interview 5 September 1994) pointed out 
that labels such as "parent" or "aunt" are often of little significance to Maori wishing to adopt, ,u,d 
therefore the distortion of relation hips is of less significance. 
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Above n 116, 72 - 72. 
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With regards to the meaning of "expedient" see Application by GN (adoption) [ 1991] NZFLR 513. 519 
per Judge Inglis QC. where he disagrees with above n25 that "expedient" needs clarifying. 
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adoption order and whose consent is required refuses to consent to the adoption, that parent's 
consent may be dispensed with under Section 8. The criteria in Section 8 tend to focus on 
parental shortcomings, reflecting "the notion that parents should not forfeit claims to their 
children without serious wrongdoing or incapacity on their part". 122 To meet this standard, 
the court requires that the parent's conduct must amount to or have resulted in a rejection of 
the parent/child bond. 123 
Although the criteria in Section 8 tend to concentrate on aspects of the parent's conduct, 
under Section 8(1)(a) parental consent may be dispensed with if the parent has "failed to 
exercise the normal duty and care of parenthood in respect of the child". 124 This failure is 
frequently invoked in step-parent applications, and allows the court to consider more child-
oriented factors. It requires a broad assessment of the parent's involvement over the child's 
whole life. In the Court of Appeal decision of Director-General of Social Welfare v L, 
Bisson J cited with approval this quote from Jeffries J in E v M: 125 
The normal duty and care owed by a parent to a child is to nurture the child to a state where 
it is independent of the parent. The nurturing process has some clearly identifiable 
characteristics which are shared by most humans. The provision of shelter, clothing, food, 
together with love and affection. In preparation for independence, education in its broadest 
sense. All this demands close and attentive physical and emotional involvement. 
Obviously, the degree of physical and emotional involvement that a parent can give a child 
is constrained if that parent does not have the day-to-day care of the child. Due account is 
therefore taken by the courts of the limited opportunity that a non-custodial parent has to 
fulfil this role, 126 and the fact that a substitute parent may now be assuming day-to-day care 
of the child. However, the non-custodial parent still has a continuing obligation to show 
122 Above n25, p 7025, para 6.708. 
123 Above n51, 133 per Casey J. 
124 The onus is on the applicants to establish the failure alleged in s8(l)(a), Re Applications by W [1991] 
NZFLR 231,234 per Judge von Dadelszen. 
125 Above nl23, 136 per Bisson J, citing with approval a quote from E v M (unreported, Wellington 
Registry, 13 September 1979). 
126 See above nl24, 235; see the same sentiments expressed a decade earlier in In the Adoption of W 
(1981) 1 NZFLR 33, 35 per Judge Bisphan. 
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affection, care and interest toward his or her children. 
The actual degree of failure that the court must find in order to determine that a parent has 
failed to fulfil the normal duty and care of parenthood is indefinite, and depends upon the 
circumstances of the case. It is an objective standard, and questions of culpability, fault or 
guilty mind are irrelevant to its determination. 127 Also, the higher the degree of failure, the 
more likely that the court will dispense with consent. 128 Suggestions have been made that 
the degree of failure that is required before a ground for forfeiting parental consent has been 
made out is higher in step-parent applications than in "normal" adoption applications. 129 
However, no recent New Zealand cases expressly support this proposition, and usually the 
degree of failure is only said to contribute to the actual exercise of the discretion to dispense 
with parental consent. For instance, in / n the Adoption of W, 130 which was an application 
by a natural mother and step-father, Judge Bisphan pointed out that, although the father had 
failed in his duty to exercise the normal duty and care of parenthood, there had not been a 
high degree of failure, and therefore his consent was not dispensed with. 
B EXERCISING THE DISCRETION TO DISPENSE WITH PARENTAL CONSENT 
1 The Welfare and Interests of the Child 
Once it has been found that grounds exist for the court to dispense with parental consent, it 
is likely that it will be exercised unless "persuasive reasons in the child's welfare and 
interests" 131 suggest otherwise. Since the Court of Appeal decision in Director-General of 
Social Welfare v L it has been established that the child's welfare and interests are the 
paramount consideration in the exercise of this discretion. 132 Richardson J argued in the 
127 
Director-General of Social Welfare v B (1984) 3 NZFLR 367, 371 per Judge Bisphan. 
128 Above nl24, 234. 
129 
See above n25, p 7027, para 6.708, citing an English authority of 1979 in support of this proposition. 
130 
Above nl26, 35. 
131 
Re Adoption Application by T (1993) 10 FRNZ 259, 264 per Judge BD Inglis QC. 
132 
The law prior to this was uncertain, for instance, if we are to compare two Family Court decisions of 
1984, in above nl27 Judge Bisphan said that the paramount consideration in the exercise of the Court's 
discretion was the child's welfare, whereas in In the Adoption of G (1984) 3 NZFLR 175, Judge Taylor 
said that a number of considerations were required, including the rights of the father, the seriousness 
25 
same case that, because issues of guardianship and custody are involved in adoption, and 
because orders under the Guardianship Act are guided by the paramountcy principle, then so 
too in all adoption cases should the child's welfare be decisive. Despite the fact that 
legislators of the Adoption Act 1955 did obviously not intend the Act's overriding principle 
to be the child's welfare and interests, the paramountcy principle is becoming increasingly 
important in all aspects of adoption proceedings. For instance, in Re Adoption of Q 133 a 
grandmother applied to adopt her grandchild with the support of the natural parents, and the 
adoption order was granted because it was thought it would further the child's welfare and 
interests. Also, in M v Kendall134, although it was agreed that the court had not had 
jurisdiction to grant two adoption orders nine years previously because the children had been 
wards of the Court, the status quo was maintained because it was in the children's best 
interests. In applications for step~parent adoption it is particularly important that Richardson 
J's broader approach be adhered to, because frequently the non-custodial parent who will be 
excluded by the adoption order does not refuse consent, 135 and therefore the issue of 
dispensing with consent may not need examining. 
Increasing judicial emphasis on child welfare is apparent in New Zealand and overseas 
jurisdictions, but in New Zealand the courts have taken the unique approach of considering 
the welfare issue in light of the type of adoption proposed. 136 In cases of step-parent and 
intra-family adoption factors that are believed to be relevant to the child's welfare are 
considered. Some of these factors impinge upon more long term considerations. In Director-
General of Social Welfare v L 137 Bisson J in the Court of Appeal believed that a broad 
focus was required due to the fact that Section 11 (b) of the Adoption Act, which requires that 
the Court be satisfied, among other things, that "the welfare and interests of the child will be 
promoted by the adoption", is different from the paramountcy principle in the Guardianship 
Act, which only mentions the child's "welfare". He thought that the inclusion of the word 
"interests" in the Adoption Act indicates an extra dimension that requires consideration of 
of the respondent's defaults. etc. 
133 (1993) JO FRNZ 340. 
134 Above nl 19. 
135 Above n67, 81. 
136 Above n63, 99. 
137 Above n5 I. 
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future implications. 138 In particular, the judiciary must take into account the future 
importance to the child of links with family, and knowledge of heritage. The other members 
of the Court of Appeal did not expressly concede with Bisson J, and his points have not been 
affirmed in subsequent cases. Hardie Boys J, in Director-General of Social Welfare v L 
appeared to differ with Bisson J. He proposed that "once consent is given or dispensed with 
the natural status and family relationships [ of the child] will be of little, if any, consequence 
in the overall assessment of the child's welfare and interests" .139 In establishing whether 
or not the making of an adoption order is in the child's welfare and interests, he thought that 
the only remaining consideration was the child's welfare. 
Before outlining the range of considerations that are made when determining whether an 
adoption order will further the child's interests and welfare, two matters require brief mention. 
The first is Counsel for the Child, which is not provided for under the Act. The report of the 
Adoption Practices Review Committee in 1990 reflected recent judicial sentiment, 140 
recognising how helpful counsel can be in assisting judges in the exercise of their discretion, 
particularly in step-parent and intra-family adoptions. 141 Although no express power exists 
for appointing counsel for the child in adoption cases, some judges have taken it upon 
themselves to appoint counsel regardless. Judge Pethig in Re Application by Nana went so 
far as to say: 142 
important as the change of status is, limiting the question to that is to overlook the importance 
of care and control on the child which of course is the heart of the provisions of the 
Guardianship Act which does create such a power to appoint counsel for the child ... [T]he Court 
of Appeal has made plain there is a necessary nexus with custody cases, which enables tJ1is 
Court in adoption cases to appoint counsel for the child. 
The second matter to be discussed, that is also of potential assistance when judges are 
deciding whether to exercise their discretion, is the social worker's report, which under 
138 
Above n51, 136 - 137 per Bisson J. 
139 Above n5 l , 137. 
140 Above n35, 661 per Judge RF Pethig. 
141 Above n29, 75. 
142 Above n2, 44. 
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Section 10 is required in all adoption situations except step-parent. This has been looked 
upon by some as another shortcoming of the Act, especially if we are to accept the statement 
made by Ormrod LJ in Re S (infants) ( adoption by parent), 143 that step-parent adoptions 
"require considerably more investigation and information than in 'normal' adoption cases". 
A Practice Note issued in 1993 by Judge GF Ellis stated that "children involved in step-parent 
adoptions are entitled to no less protection than those involved in 'stranger' adoption or any 
other proceedings affecting the welfare of the child". 144 He then proceeded to point out that 
he would require the provision of a social worker's report, "or the equivalent", 145 in every 
adoption application coming before the Court. However, as Judge Pethig made clear in W 
v S, 146 the question ultimately lies with Parliament to decide whether it sees this as a matter 
of importance. 147 
2 Retention of Links with Natural Parents 
Of primary importance in the exercise of the discretion to dispense with parental consent is 
the child's links with the natural parent who will be excluded by the adoption order. If the 
child is older and knew the parent, and there is the possibility that the child can derive 
something positive from the relationship, then the discretion is unlikely to be exercised. It 
follows that if the step-parent has been a parent-figure to the child for all or most of the 
child's life, and if the child regards the step-family as his or her only family, then adoption 
may be seen as merely "bringing the legal position into line with reality" .148 ln reality, 
however, the issue is seldom as clearcut as this. For instance, even if the parent has 
•, 
effectively rejected the parent/child bond, or if there is evidence of neglect and rejection, 
143 Above n84, 676 (CA). 
144 
[ 1993] NZFLR 894, 895. 
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Judge Ellis did not elaborate on this point. therefore it is unclear just what "equivalent" refers to. It 
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146 Above n72, 661. 
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children often retain a positive image of their non-custodial parent, 149 and may not wish to 
sever links. 
When considering the significance of the parent/child bond, attention must be paid to the 
historical weight attached to parental status. Although in New Zealand there is no 
presumption that a child's welfare is best met in the care of a natural parent, 150 this 
presumption did exist in days gone by, and courts have struggled hard to rid themselves of 
the notion of parental status as determinative. 151 
Insight into the dynamics that underlie discussions on parent/child bonds in adoption cases 
can be gained by examining "rights" rhetoric in the judicial application of access provisions. 
There is manifest confusion as to whether or not access is a right of the parent or the child. 
For instance, in Sharman v Sharman 152 Anderson J said that "[t]he child's right to access 
is paramount". If this is indeed so then a child may effectively sever links with a non-
custodial parent, even if the child is under the influence of the custodial parent, or if the child 
is not mature enough to appreciate the significance of his or her decision. Alternatively, the 
idea of access as a right of the parent was expressed by the House of Lords in / n re KD ( a 
minor), 153 with Lord Oliver stating that natural parents have a claim to access to their 
children, and that this claim coincides with the child's welfare because it is assumed that 
children benefit from continued contact with their natural parents. However, Graeme Austin 
preempts the rights debate by pointing out that "[t]he 'right' to access possibly does little 
more than express the presumption that children benefit from contact with the non-custodial 
parent" .154 Certainly this is apparent in contemporary adoption cases, with judges 
emphasizing that the adoption order will not be made because continued contact with the 
parent who will be excluded by the order is in the best interests of the child. However, if this 
reasoning is applied too rigidly the consequences can be highly que~tionable, as in the case 
149 
Above n3 l, 136. 
150 See J v J and J (1983) l FRNZ l (CA). 
151 
Graeme Austin Children: Stories the Law Tells (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1994) 39. 
152 (1988) 5 NZFLR 91, 92. 
153 
[1988) l ABER 577, 590 per Lord Oliver. 
154 Above nl51, 163. 
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of S v Y155• Here, Judge Aubin found that grounds existed for dispensing with the non-
custodial parent's consent in a step-parent adoption application -the father had spent lengthy 
periods in prison, and was found to have failed in the normal duty and exercise of 
parenthood. However, the judge thought that it was unjust to exercise the discretion, because 
there was a likelihood that a continuing relationship between the father and son would have 
existed had the father not gone to jail. Judge Aubin's conclusion that the discretion should 
not be exercised was arrived at despite the acknowledgement that there was a "question mark 
of sizeable proportions as to the role which Mr X could play in the life of his son in the 
future". 156 
Rather than acting on presumptions it is arguably preferable for the court to adopt an 
individualized, investigative role in determining whether or not the child's welfare and 
interests will be promoted by retaining legal links with a non-custodial parent. Mark 
Henaghan proposes that this approach be taken in access cases. 157 However, there is a 
fundamental difference between cases involving access and adoption, and that is that adoption 
cases entail a mandatory consideration of the child's longterm welfare. Given the current 
strong support for open adoption, the presence of a non-custodial parent arguing for a legal 
right to continued contact with his or her child is likely to carry significant weight. That does 
not mean, however, that the parent's wishes are relevant to the exercise of the court's 
discretion. On the contrary, only when a parent has actually exhibited a renewal of interest 
in the child, which purportedly promotes the child's interests and welfare, will the parent's 
wishes be influential. If this parental interest is lacking, the adoption order may well proceed, 
as happened in the case of A and A v T158• In that case, which had very similar facts to S 
v Y, the discretion to dispense with consent was exercised, the judge saying about the non-
custodial parent: 
He has avoided his responsibility by the choice of a particular lifestyle which has resulted in 
him being almost continuously in prison. I cannot see any advantage in the relationship of the 
155 (1984) 3 NZFLR 166. 
156 Above nl49, 173. 
157 Above n32, 142. 
158 (1986) 2 FRNZ 156. 
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child with the father being fostered, which relationship is based entirely on a biological link. 
3 Retention of Links with Family 
In deciding whether to exercise its discretion, the court will also consider the child's links to 
siblings, grandparents and extended family. It must be kept in mind that this consideration, 
unlike parental links, has little legal foundation because natural relatives have no rights that 
are extinguished upon the granting of an adoption order. 159 Generally, though, if the child 
is older, and knows his or her family, the court may feel that it is not in the child's interests 
or welfare to sever these relationships. 160 
Often, however, an adoption order is granted in those situations where, although the child has 
an ongoing relationship with family members, the adoption will occur in an open 
environment, and these relationships will in practice not be severed. This was the case in L 
v B, 161 where the child was able to maintain contact with siblings via her mother, who also 
had a strong relationship with the siblings, her own children. Similarly, the applicants' 
intentions to support the child's contact with her whanau led to Judge Inglis QC granting an 
adoption order in / n the Adoption of J. 162 The under I ying theme in these decisions is that 
the adoption is necessary for the child's security, and that if access to family members is to 
be continued it is in the child's best interests if it is done so "from the security of a family 
who [the child] knows are responsible for him and will protect his interests". 163 The 
granting of adoption orders in these circumstances may also be an acknowledgement of the 
fact that, irrespective of the legal situation that will emerge, "the severance of links with the 
old family will or will not occur irrespective of court orders".1 64 
159 
See In re C (a minor) (adoption order: conditions) [1989] AC 1, 18 per Lord Ackner. It could be 
contended that because some members of the extended family can apply for guardianship under the 
Guardianship Act s16 that they do in fact have rights. However, they require leave to do so, and the 
range of circumstances are very limited. 
160 
Re D (minors) (adoption by step-parent) (1980) 2 FLR 102 per Ormrod J. 
161 (1982) 1 NZFLR 232. 
162 [1992] NZFLR 369. 
163 Above nl31, 265. 
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4 Retention of links with cultural heritage 
Under the Adoption Act 1955 a child's race is unaffected by an adoption order. 165 Little 
other consideration is shown of cultural factors that necessarily impact upon the adoption of 
a Maori child. A child's cultural heritage cannot be assured, as an adoption order severs all 
biological relationships, does not require the input of the whanau or, in some circumstances, 
the natural father, and the only condition that can be made on an adoption order relates to 
religion. 166 This can lead to the adoption of Maori children in spite of the objection of the 
child's Maori whanau. Such a situation arose in Re Adoption A9!90, 167 where the natural 
mother and step-father's adoption application was successful, despite the objection of the 
Maori natural father, and that the judge was aware that the couple were about to separate and 
the step-father take the child to Canada with him to live. Judge Inglis's following statement 
implies that children's knowledge of their cultural heritage is linked to parents' willingness 
to foster this knowledge. It disregards the fact that in New Zealand a person is much more 
likely to gain a knowledge of the Maori culture than overseas. 168 
Against the clear advantages of adoption for [the child], the disadvantages that she will not see 
her natural father as frequently and the possible impairment of what the natural father describes 
as her cultural identity are of relatively minor importance. The issue of cultural identity does 
not trouble the mother, and the natural father's apparent concern about it would have carried 
more weight if he had demonstrated responsibility as a parent by positive action. 
In T v S ( no 1 )169 Judge Inglis again arrived at a conclusion that did not address the 
concerns of the Maori in the case. Here, it was the Maori grandmother who was applying 
for revocation of an interim adoption order. Judge Inglis established that the grandmother did 
not have standing for the application, and that the grounds she had claimed warranted 
revoking the order were merely technical matters that would not have warranted revocation 
anyway. However, Judge Inglis seemed to be aware of the grandmother's real basis for the 
165 Section 16(2)(e). 
166 Section l l (c). 
167 (1990) 7 FRNZ 524. 
168 Above nl67. 528. 
169 [1990] NZFLR 41 l. 
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application -"her belief, founded in tradition, that the adoption of a Maori child is a matter 
to be determined by the whole whanau and not just by the natural parents". 170 He pointed 
out that the grandmother had no legal interest to apply for revocation. 171 
[However,] in the Maori perspective [her] position would be seen quite differently, but unless 
and until the law is changed by Parliament so as to give express recognition of the Maori 
perspective, the Court must take tl1e law as it finds it. 
Similar statements have been made with respect to the access provisions of the Guardianship 
Act l 968, acknowledging their inherent cultural insensitivity, 172 but aware that access can 
only be extended to whanau when Parliament so decrees. 
Even though the Adoption Act is inconsistent with Maori notions of whakapapa or 
genealogical inheritance, recent cases have found the law to be flexible enough to develop 
practices and policies that do in fact align with Maori values. The open adoption movement 
has been influential in this respect. In Adoption by RRM and RBM173 an aunt's adoption 
application was successful, Williams J recognising that in practice the bond between the 
natural parents and the child would not be severed, and instead the natural parents would be 
additional parents of the child. Williams J stated: 174 
it is perfectly possible by granting tl1e adoption order to harmonise tl1e different set of values 
which lie behind traditional approaches to adoption on tl1e one hand and Maori concepts of the 
family on tl1e other. 
A number of cases reflect the idea that the Adoption Act can be applied in a manner that 
recognises the concerns and values of Maori. Judge Boshier in Re Adoption of A 175 granted 
170 
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an adoption order in favour of the Maori grandparents of a young child whom they had cared 
for since birth. The decision to adopt had been made by the family, from a Maori customary 
perspective, and it had been indicated by the applicants that despite the legal change in 
relationships that an adoption order would create, in practice the operation of the whanau 
would remain unchanged. In granting the adoption order, Judge Boshier pointed out: 
It can be clearly argued that the place of the Treaty of Waitangi and the concept of partnership 
between Maori and Pakeha means that a more progressive appreciation of customary law and 
the Tangatawhenua is now required. 
Just such a progressive appreciation of customary law was shown by Judge Boshier in Re 
Adoption by Paul and Hauraki, 176 where, despite the fact that joint applications for adoption 
under the Adoption Act can only be made by legally married couples, Judge Boshier 
recognised that the unmarried couple who applied to adopt the child were living in a 
customary Maori marriage, and therefore the application was allowed to proceed and was 
successful. A further example of judicial appreciation of Maori values is found in Application 
by C, 177 where the Pakeha applicants who applied to adopt a Maori child were unsuccessful 
because, despite conforming to the standards required of adoptive parents in every other 
respect, they showed little appreciation or interest in the significance of the child's Maori 
heritage, and the judge was therefore not satisfied that the child's welfare and interests would 
be promoted by the adoption. 
5 Child's wishes 
Under Section l l(b) the court is required to consider the wishes of the child, having regard 
to the age and understanding of the child, when determining whether or not the interests and 
welfare of the child will be promoted by the adoption. Victoria and Tasmania, 178 like New 
Zealand, rely on the judiciary and other professionals involved in the proceedings to 
176 [1993] NZFLR 267. 
177 
[ 1990] NZFLR 280. 
178 Margaret Otlowski "The Changing Face of Adoption Law in Tasmania" (1989) 3 Australian J of Family 
Law 161. 177. 
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determine the competency of children to ascertain their feelings on the adoption, and the ,. 
weight to be attributed to these feelings. 179 In the United Kingdom under the current 
Adoption Act 1976180 and under the Children Act 1989181 the Court must likewise pay 
regard to the child's wishes and feelings, in the light of the child's age and understanding. 
The White Paper, however, proposes that all children aged 12 years or older must agree 
before an adoption order is made, unless they are incapable of giving such agreement. 
Children are also eligible for party status, and are therefore able to directly inform the Court 
of their own preferences. 182 
In practice it appears that Section 1 l(b) is seldom influential. 183 It is often thought that 
children do not understand what adoption is about, or what the full implications of adoption 
are. 184 As Judge DJ Carruthers said in Re Adoptions 46 - 47187185 with regard to the 
wishes of two children aged seven and ten years: 
the children cannot possibly be acquainted with an overall view of the situation nor can they 
have any appreciation at all of what their own needs might be as they develop and become 
teenagers and grow into adults. 
Children's wishes are also occasionally regarded as circumspect in step-parent applications 
because of a fear that the child will have been indoctrinated by the natural parent and step-
parent against the non-custodial parent. 186 Even if indoctrination is too strong a word, there 
is evidence that children may feel obliged to emphasize the wishes of their custodial 
parent.181 
179 The landmark decision of the House of Lords in Gillick v Wes1 Norfolk and Wisbech Area I leal1h 
AUlhorities [ 1986) AC 112 is of relevance here; see above n44, 151. 
180 Section 6 of the Adoption Act 1976 (UK). 
181 Section 1 of the Children Act 1989 (UK). 
182 Below n229. p 6, para 4.3. 
183 Mark Duke (written correspondence 25 August 1994) believes that the child's wishes are very 
significant, and, in particular. step-parent and intra-frunily adoption should be available if the child 
wishes for the adoption to take place. 
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Re Adoptions 3 and 4190 (1990) 7 FRNZ 45, 51. 
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186 Above n 124, 237. 
187 Above n67, 81. 
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Many writers stress the need felt by children to placate and comfort the parent they are living 
with, and this makes it difficult to ascertain the wishes and feelings of a child who is dependent 
on the approval of the parent and step-parent who are applying to adopt. 
6 Other relevant considerations 
A number of other factors are considered when judges seek to determine whether or not the 
child's welfare and interests will be promoted by dispensing with parental consent and 
allowing the adoption to proceed. These may include the parental capacity of the adoptive 
parent/s, and the adoptive parent's relationship with the child. The relationship between the 
adoptive parent's and absent parent is relevant, because if it is one of acrimony and hostility, 
the child may suffer conflicting and harmful effects. 188 The applicant's motive in seeking 
the adoption may be examined, particularly in step-parent applications. 
C RE-THINKING GUARDIANSHIP 
The outcome of step-parent and intra-family adoptions is likely to be significantly influenced 
by the judge's decision as to whether or not an alternative legal order will meet the needs of 
the respective parties. In New Zealand, guardianship assumes fundamental significance in this 
respect - it is flexible, it can be subsequently altered, and it avoids the bizarre situation of a 
natural parent applying to adopt his or her own child. 189 Hillyer J was influenced by the 
Guardianship Act's provisions in MR v Department of Social Welfare. 190 He declined to 
grant an adoption order to the grandmother of a five year old child whom she had cared for 
since birth, preferring instead to keep in place custody and guardianship orders made in 
favour of the grandmother, and thereby allowing the child's "affectionate" relationship with 
his mother to continue unimpeded. 
A different approach is evident in the judgement of Williams J in Application for Adoption 
188 Above nl61, 239. 
189 Note that under the White Paper, below n229, p 13, para 5.22, a natural parent does not adopt his or 
her own child. 
190 
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by RRM and RBM, 19 1 where the issue was whether the adoption of a two year old Maori 
girl by her aunt and uncle with whom she had lived with since birth would further her welfare 
and interests. Williams J expressly questioned the District Court Judge's reliance on MR v 
Department of Social Welfare, 192 distinguishing the facts of the two cases on a number of 
grounds, but placing particular reliance on the fact that in MR v Department of Social Welfare 
the grandmother's application had been opposed by the Department of Social Welfare, 
whereas in the current case the adoption was supported from all quarters, including the 
Ministry of Maori Development. Although William J's decision in the High Court does 
undermine the authority of MR v Department of Social Welfare, it is constrained by its factual 
context - a customary Maori adoption - and does not expressly challenge the general notion 
that guardianship may be a more appropriate legal order in intra-family situations than 
adoption. 
ln Victoria and Tasmania alternative legal orders to adoption have assumed such significance 
that legal presumptions have been enacted, mandating that judges grant an alternative order 
in applications for step-parent and intra-family adoption, unless adoption better serves the 
child's interests and welfare, and exceptional or special circumstances exist. 193 ln contrast, 
the recent White Paper on adoption reform in the United Kingdom has recommended that the 
current presumption in favour of alternative orders be abolished, mainly because the 
presumption was not in practice reducing the incidence of step-parent and intra-family 
adoption. 194 
Current sentiments in favour of guardianship as compared to adoption have been given as a 
reason for challenging New Zealand's traditional role as a "world leader" in child welfare, in 
a recent issue of the New Zealand Adoption Council's newsletter. 195 This is because New 
Zealand legislation and policies are being found to be increasingly out-of-step with major 
191 
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initiatives throughout the world. 196 Guardianship is an area in which New Zealand is being 
seen as out-of-date. This is because there are no research studies or data which show that 
guardianship has any acknowledged benefits for children. 197 Furthermore, the potential 
disadvantages of guardianship are apparent. "Guardianship is disturbingly similar to long-
term foster care, which has been shown through research to have far fewer advantages than 
adoption, with adoption offering far more stability and benefits" .198 The recent Hague 
Convention substantiates this claim by only granting recognition to "full" adoption as 
compared to "simple" adoption or guardianship. In an article in the newsletter, William 
Pierce cites two major considerations which led to the Convention arriving at this 
decision. 199 Firstly, "child welfare and child development considerations clearly indicate 
that a permanent family in law is the best way to achieve good results for children who 
cannot be properly or appropriately reared by their biological parents".200 Secondly, only 
a full adoption grants to a child the developmental and legal rights which are in the child's 
best interests.201 In conclusion, Pierce proposes: 
Informal adoption, guardianship, and simple adoption are increasingly seen as relics of pre-
literate, rural societies where property rights and biological families' interests were considered 
more important than the best interests of the child. For the 21st Century, full adoption is the 
social and legal form of adoption of choice, as The Hague Convention clearly reflects. 
This proposal is not shared by many professionals involved in the adoption process, 
particularly in situations where children are older and have had some sort of contact with their 
natural family, which may often be the situation in step-family and intra-family cases.202 
196 Above n 10, I; for instance, in Australia a more rational open records policy is being preferred, and in 
the United Kingdom and the United States moves are being made to remove ideological concerns from 
impacting upon child placements. 
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For instance, Keith Griffith (interview 26 July 1994) believes that adoption is usually only appropriate 
if the child is two years or younger. 
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Many of those who do believe that guardianship has a role to play in some adoption scenarios 
are willing to acknowledge that there are situations where adoption is in the child's best 
interests. This is particularly so in situations where the spectre of the orders being challenged 
could be destabilizing to the child, as was the case in Re Adoption of Q,203 where the 
grandmother's custody order over her six year old grandson was replaced by an adoption 
order. The grandmother applied for adoption because the natural mother's new husband had 
a history of criminal convictions for sexually deviant crimes, including against children, and 
the judge was satisfied that the extra security afforded by adoption would further the child's 
welfare and interests. Children's stability may also be threatened in situations where their 
custodial natural parent dies, or where the relationship between their natural custodial parent 
and step-parent breaks down. 204 In the former situation, even if the natural parent had 
appointed the step-parent, grandparent or any other significant adult in the child's life as the 
child's testamentary guardian, that adult's status as guardian of the child may be challenged 
by a surviving natural parent if that parent is also a guardian.205 In the situation where a 
natural parent and step-parent divorce, the child's link with the step-parent is reliant on a 
successful access application. 
Guardianship orders may also fail to protect the stability of some children's relationships if 
the adults concerned do not fit within the criteria in Sections 15 and 16 of the Guardianship 
Act. Under Section 15 only a child's parents or those in loco parentis may initiate 
proceedings as of right. Section 16 specifies that certain other relatives may apply for 
guardianship in certain limited circumstances. The adults that may apply are grandparents, 
siblings, and aunts and uncles. Obviously in some cases relatives other than these may wish 
to apply for access. This is particularly so in cases of traditional Maori adoption. 
Furthermore, the situations in which relatives under Section 16 may seek the leave of the 
Court to apply for guardianship are very limited. Either the child's parents must have died, 
203 
[ 1993] 10 FRNZ 340. 
204 Mark Duke (written correspondence 25 August I 994) does not think that the instability of guardi,mship 
per se is problematic. given that children are affected by the instability of their parent's 
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Section 10 of the Guardianship Act I 968 allows the other parent or guardian to apply to the court to 
have a testamentary guardian removed. Under sl0(2) only when parents are being deprived of 
guardianship must the court be satisfied that the parent is for some grave reason unfit to he guardian 
of the child or unwilling to exercise the responsibilities of guardianship. 
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or must have been refused access to the child by the Court, or the parent had access to the 
child but made no attempt to exercise it. 
If guardianship is to retain its challenged role as the "present day panacea for concerns about 
authority within and continuation of step-relationships with children",206 and if it is to 
continue to be applied as an effective alternative to intra-family adoption applications, then 
the notion of guardianship in the Guardianship Act needs rethinking. In particular, the legal 
ramifications of guardianship may need amending so that they are less likely to impact in a 
negative way upon the real and perceived stability of the placement. One suggestion is that 
a presumption of continued guardianship be applied in situations of testamentary guardianship, 
thereby ensuring that the situation remains imbued with a sense of stability. This presumption 
would require any surviving parent to seek leave to apply for removal of the testamentary 
guardian, the granting of leave conditional on the parent making out a prima facie case that 
the guardianship appointment is detrimental to the child's welfare. 207 
On the other hand, it may be contended that guardianship is a worthwhile and effective legal 
remedy as it is currently conceived, but that it is not ideally suited to deal with adoption in 
general, or with the many and conflicting issues that arise in applications for step-parent and 
intra-family adoption. Instead, the law may be required to develop a new means of 
addressing these situations. 
VI STEP-PARENT AND INTRA-FAMILY ADOPTION: 
RECOGNISING "SIGNIFICANT OTHERS" 
That New Zealand's Adoption Act 1955 is in need of reform is obvious. In the forty years 
since its enactment major social upheavals have taken place, and adoption as it is practised 
today seldom conforms to the assumptions underlying the legislation. Judge Boshier alluded 
to this when he said "[i]t will be a happy day when aspects of the Adoption Act are 
206 Above n3 , 503. 
207 A Hend.ra "Stepfamilies: a Fresh Approach" (1993) I Buuerworths Fam U 26, 27. 
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changed ... [to] be replaced by more progressive and uncomplicated considerations". 208 
Judge Pethig expressed similar concerns in Re Application by Nana, 109 substantiating his 
argument with the statement that, in particular, the large number of step-parent adoptions are 
responsible for the Act losing any "inherent integrity" it once possessed. 
Yet simple disapproval of the practice of step-parent, and intra-family, adoption is not going 
to help the parties themselves resolve the complex issues that caused them to make an 
adoption application. The children who are the subject of step-parent and intra-family 
adoptions are in need of the law's protection and guidance. The law on adoption needs to 
recognise that these children have often formed close bonds with their potential adoptive 
parents, and that these children may also have relationships with a number of other adults. 
How then can we transform adoption law so that it recognises the role played by "significant 
others" in these children's lives? 
Before considering the various options for the reform of adoption law, it is important that 
agreement is reached as to the fundamental aim of adoption. That aim is to secure a 
permanent home for a child.210 Adoption has traditionally done this by transferring a child, 
for virtually all purposes, from the biological family to a new adoptive family, severing all 
links with the biological family. It is with some urgency that we must ask "whether this 
outcome is necessary or desirable in order to ensure permanence or whether it might be more 
appropriate to achieve this objective in some other way without changing the child's identity 
and wider relationships?" .211 Current thinking on open adoption suggests that the latter 
alternative is desirable. That does not mean that the adoptive parents are not ultimately 
responsible for the child, or that the child's sense of stability will be undermined. lnstead, 
it acknowledges that "stability" is a flexible concept, and means different things to different 
people.212 
208 
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A reformed adoption law must be flexible as well as protective and supportive, enabling 
adoption to proceed in the child's interests, yet equally serving those interests by allowing for 
the possibility of contact with the natural family in appropriate cases. 
It is also important to keep in mind when considering the various options for reform that if 
well-infonned public debate does not accompany changes in the law, then any change in 
attitudes or practices is improbable. During the recent discussions on adoption law reform 
in the United Kingdom it was recommended that a study on the public's view be carried out, 
in order to ascertain whether a more "inclusive" model, or a wider range of adoptions, would 
be broadly acceptable.213 
At the end of the day, however, the ultimate decision lies with the State as to whether or not 
the reform of adoption law goes ahead. Given that the legislation does not impact on the 
Government's purse strings, it is unlikely to be a priority in the forthcoming agenda.214 
A PROTECTING A CHILD'S MANY RELATIONSHIPS 
Many commentators have tackled the question of how an adoption order can provide a child 
with substitute parents while simultaneously protecting the child's other relationships, arriving 
at a variety of recommendations.215 One strategy would be to expand our current legal 
regime under the Guardianship Act, so that step-parents, grandparents and other "significant 
others" would obtain some form of access to the child without undermining the adoptive 
parents' authority. This would not require a thorough examination of the Adoption Act 
except in so far as the adoptive parents may be required to legally acknowledge the role 
played by these adults in their child's life. However, this proposal fails to challenge the 
"closed stranger" paradigm that underlies adoption law in New Zealand. If we are to accept 
213 Above n67, 13. 
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that children's welfare and interests are promoted by the fostering of a variety of legal 
relationships with the child, then so too should we recognize how hopelessly inadequate the 
Adoption Act is in the face of fundamental changes to adoption practice and philosophy. A 
longterm strategy is required, in which adoption law is transformed so as to meet the needs 
of today's families. 
When considering the transformation of New Zealand's adoption law, it is appropriate to 
examine the recent changes made to the law of adoption in the United Kingdom. This is 
because in both countries adoption has been premised on a model of "closed stranger" 
adoption, but that premise is increasingly obsolete. The 1990 Adoption Practices Review 
Committee recommended some study be undertaken of the recent amendments in Britain 
before any broad review of the New Zealand Adoption Act.216 
Widescale reform of childcare legislation in Britain was heralded by the enactment of the 
Children Act 1989. Described as the "most far-reaching reform of child law in England this 
century",217 the Act did not directly seek to reform adoption law. However, orders available 
under the Children Act are applicable to adoption proceedings. Also, adoption law will 
inevitably be influenced by the Children Act's dual principles of parental responsibility and 
the paramountcy of the child's welfare. 
Perhaps the most discernible impact of the Children Act on adoption is the repeal of Section 
14(3) of the Adoption Act 1976, which required the court to dismiss a step-parent application 
if it considered the matter would be better dealt with under custody, or other, proceedings. 
No doubt the repeal of Section 14(3) was motivated by its failure to halt the increase in step-
parent adoptions. It has been noted how paradoxical it is that the Children Act has removed 
all impediments to the granting of step-parent adoptions, where the other natural parent is 
permanently excluded, and yet in the field of adoption generally there is a more tolerant 
attitude towards the idea of contact between children and their natural parents.218 However, 
that ignores the range of orders that can be made under the Children Act in addition to 
216 Above n29, 74. 
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adoption, the effect of which can be a legally imposed open adoption. 
Adoption orders could be made subject to access before the enactment of the Children Act. 
Under Section 12(6) of the Adoption Act l 976 (UK) an adoption order can contain terms and 
conditions that the court thinks fit. However, the provision received little judicial support, 
in the light of the prevailing attitude that access is "fundamentally inconsistent with principles 
which underlie the making of an adoption order".219 Although residence and contact orders 
under the Children Act are more accessible than Section l 2(6), the granting of these orders 
may be limited in the face of judicial reluctance, or even disapproval. 
A residence order under Section 8 of the Children Act 1989 settles the arrangements to be 
made as to the person with whom a child is to live. If the order is made in favour of 
someone other than the child's parent or guardian, that person obtains "parental responsibility" 
for the child while the order is in force. Parental responsibility is defined in Section 3 as all 
the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has 
in relation to the child and his or her property. There are some matters which are not dealt 
with under the power of parental responsibility which may make it inappropriate in some 
situations. For instance, the inability to appoint a testamentary guardian may be of great 
concern to a grandparent who is caring for a child, and does not wish the child to be under 
the care of the natural parent. Likewise, children who are being cared for by their 
grandparents may be upset that they cannot change their surname to conform to their 
grandparents' name in the face of an absent father's refusal to consent. 
A contact order under Section 8 requires the person with whom the child lives, or is to live, 
to allow the child to visit or otherwise have contact with another person. Contact orders can 
cover a wide ambit of activity, from physical contact to telephone calls, and, like other 
Section 8 orders, may be made in favour of anyone during any family proceedings in which 
a question arises with respect to the welfare of any child.220 Generally, the courts are more 
likely to grant orders to those who have applied for them, or who have indicated their 
219 Re C (wardship and adoption) (1981) 2 FLR 177. 
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willingness for such an order to be made. 221 Section 10 governs the situations in which 
applications for Section 8 orders may be made. Any parents or guardians of the child, or any 
person in whose favour a residence order is in force with respect to the child, are 
automatically entitled to apply to the court for a Section 8 order.222 Certain non-parents 
may apply for a residence or contact order as of right, for instance, if the consent of all those 
with parental responsibility is obtained,223 or if the child has lived with the applicant for at 
least three years (within the past five). 224 A step-parent may be able to apply under a 
variety of provisions, though of particular relevance is Section 10(5)(a), which provides that 
any party to a marriage in relation to whom the child is a child of the family may apply. 
Anyone else may apply with the leave of the court.225 In determining whether the creation, 
variation or discharge of a Section 8 order will best serve the child's welfare, the court is 
required to have particular regard to seven statutory criteria, among them the child's wishes 
and feelings, the child's needs, and the capability of the parents.226 
Contact orders under the Children Act have enhanced the notion of access between children 
and "significant others" upon the incidence of, among other things, adoption. They are 
permanent227 and flexible,228 and may be applied in situations where there is a manifest 
need for some form of contact, but the law did not previously allow for it. This is 
particularly so because the court may make a contact order as well as an adoption order if 
it wishes, for instance in favour of the birth parents, or in favour of the birth father in a step-
parent adoption. Also, while under Britain's previous access provisions natural relatives had 
221 Above n65, 35. 
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no right to apply for access once an adoption order had been granted, under the Children Act 
a relative could apply for a contact order with the leave of the court. 
The White Paper on adoption law reform presented by the Secretary of State for Health to 
the British Parliament in November 1993 builds upon the open framework of the Children 
Act. The White Paper sought to address a number of problems with the current adoption law. 
One of these problems was the fact that, although open adoption could now be formalised 
with orders under the Children Act, legislative policy under the Adoption Act did not favour 
this approach. A second problem lay with the fact that existing alternatives to adoption in 
step-parent and intra-family situations often failed to meet the needs of children. In response 
to these problems, and others, the White Paper proposed a new adoption regime that 
recognizes a degree of contact with birth families after adoption may be desirable, but that 
upholds the most important objective of adoption to be the support of the new family 
relationship.229 Thus, the support given to open adoption is merely qualified. Labled as 
a "useful" reform, rhetoric surrounding the introduction of the White Paper lauded its 
"comrnonsense" approach as an antithesis to the political correctness that had hitherto been 
distorting the adoption process.230 Alternatively, critics of the White Paper have been 
derisive of the conservative "Victorian" or family values that it is based upon, and of the 
Paper's false claim to political neutrality when in fact it is espousing Conservative rhetoric 
underlaid with a strong "New Right" agenda.231 Whatever the ideology is that underlies the 
White Paper, it does appear to offer an effective solution to the two problems above. This 
solution is derived from the fact that, although the permanent legal severance that adoption 
entails is only justified if it is of clear and significant advantage to the child, the alternative 
legal orders have been expanded and strengthened, and do now constitute a legitimate 
alternative to an adoption order. 
The White Paper retains the concept of adoption as a permanent solution for children whose 
229 "Adoption: The Future" (Department of Health, London. 1993) CM 2288, p 7, para 4.14. 
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birth families cannot provide them with a suitable upbringing. 232 So long as this remains 
the definition of adoption, adoption is inherently unsuitable for situations where an adult 
wants his or her care and responsibility for a child to be given legal recognition and 
protection, yet does not need the adoption order to ensure the provision of a permanent home 
for the child. This may be more likely to occur in step-parent and intra-family situations than 
in "stranger" adoptions, simply because children who are the subject of a step-parent or intra-
family adoption application are probably already living in a secure family environment, 
whereas children in state welfare institutions, or babies born to mothers who decide not to 
bring their children up, are not. However, in some step-parent and intra-family situations that 
will not necessarily be the case, and it may be in the child's welfare and interests that an 
adoption order is granted to ensure the child's familial security is not undermined.233 
Under the current law in Britain, despite legislative and judicial discouragement, step-parent 
and intra-family adoptions have increased proportionately to other types of adoption. They 
now constitute half of the total adoptions.234 It is possible that the reason for this increase 
is not because these situations all required the unique sense of permanency that accompanies 
adoption, but because no alternative orders adequately addressed the parties' needs. The 
White Paper seeks to remedy this trend by strengthening alternative orders to adoption. In 
particular, it creates the Parental Responsibility Agreement to deal with step-family situations, 
and Inter-Vivos Guardianship to deal with intra-family situations. Both of these orders are 
influenced by the philosophy underpinning the Children Act 1989, that is, the retention of 
legal recognition of the parent/child bond. 
The Parental Responsibility Agreement creates a joint parental responsibility to be exercised 
by both parent and step-parent, without legally severing links with the other birth parent.235 
The procedure is simple, with the consent of the other natural parent not required, no court 
232 Above n229, p 6, para 4.5. 
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hearing necessary, the child's welfare not investigated and the step-parent' suitability not 
assessed. The Agreement proposal has been praised because it seeks to meet step-parents' 
needs in a positive way, and does not replicate the nuclear family paradigm that underlies 
orthodox adoption law.236 It is also credited with being revocable, which, unlike adoption, 
means that issues of abrogation will not arise if the step-marriage subsequently dissolves. 
Abrogation of adoption orders has assumed increasing significance in recent years. This 
appears to be due in part to the relatively higher incidence of divorce in second 
marriages,237 and to the more frequent occurrence of step-parent adoptions. A concern that 
arises is that a step-parent who has adopted his or her step-child may wish to abrogate the 
adoption when the step-marriage is dissolved. This will allow the step-parent to be rid of the 
obligations, in particular financial, that accompany the adoption.238 In the United States the 
courts are tending to deny abrogations of adoptions. 239 The reasons for this are twofold. 
Firstly, the courts are influenced by the finality of adoption decrees, and their underlying 
notion of permanency. Secondly, abrogation of an adoption order is not in the best interests 
of the child, who may lose his or her only source of financial support.240 
[Also, i]f the judge abrogates tJ1e adoption and destroys the legal parent-child relationship, the 
child whose biological parents' rights have ended through death or judicial termination of rights. 
may be bereft of parents and left to tJ1e vagaries of the child welfare system. 
Kathleen Lynch241 recognises that many parents may be forced by economic considerations 
into the decision to abrogate, but suggests that a preferable and less disruptive olution is for 
the courts to allow parents to bring a tort action for wrongful adoption, if the situation so 
demands.242 The damages awarded in a successful case to parents who have been victims 
236 Above n230. 8. 
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of fraud in adoption proceedings could be used to ease the financial burden of child support 
payments. Lynch concludes that, in an attempt to lessen the frequency of abrogation 
applications, adoption statutes should include short-time periods before a step-parent can adopt 
a step-child,243 and that the only basis for abrogation be fraud. 
The second alternative to adoption proposed by the White Paper is a new guardianship order 
intended to allow relatives or others caring for a child to obtain legal recognition of their role, 
and, without going so far as adoption, to put their relationship onto a more permanent and 
clearer basis. The order, known as Inter-Vivas Guardianship, supplements a residence order. 
The person in whose favour it is made is described as a "foster-parent plus", while the child's 
legal relationship with his or her parents is not severed by the order. The order remedies 
previous criticism that residence orders do not allow the appointment of testamentary 
guardians. It also requires the leave of court for dissolution. In combination with the 
Parental Responsibility Agreement, it is hoped that Inter-Vivas Guardianship will "add to the 
range of legal instruments available to reflect and reinforce the various different long-term 
relationships that children may have with those who care for them in different capacities".244 
Thus Britian appears to be well on its way to rethinking the legal concept of adoption so that 
it conforms with current adoption practice and philosophy. Under the Children Act provision 
has been made for orders that seek to meet the diverse needs of today's families. It is hoped 
that residence orders will address the concerns of parties to step-parent adoption without 
requiring the severance of the stepchild's relationship with the other natural parent. Similarly, 
it is hoped that residence orders will resolve the concerns of a grandparent caring for a 
grandchild, who does not wish the child to be placed within the care of a natural parent. The 
strengthening of the residence order under the White Paper's Inter-Vivas Guardianship makes 
it more likely that adoption will not be looked upon as the only means of addressing needs 
such as these. If, however, adoption is the only effective way of ensuring that the child's 
welfare and interests will be promoted, the Children Act provides for contact orders, which 
243 For instance, under s20(2) of the Adoption Act 1988 (Tas) in order to apply for a step-parent adoption 
the couple must have been married for a period of three years before the adoption order is made. that 
period including a stable continuous de facto relationship immediately before their marriage. 
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can ensure that adopted children remain in contact with significant others in their life, thus 
acknowledging the longterm nature of children 's welfare and interests. 
New Zealand has much to learn from these developments. Of particular influence is the 
notion of "parental responsibility" introduced by the Children Act, and expanded upon in the 
White Paper. Described as "a re-invigorated sense of parenthood and one that is durable 
despite the vicissitudes that may befall a family" ,245 the idea that parents legally take on 
duties and responsibilities avoids proprietal notions of parenthood whereby parents acquire 
children at the expense of other people in the child's life. 
B MAORJ ADOPTION: RECOGNIZING WHANAU INTERESTS 
In New Zealand, when considering the legal avenues for familial involvement in the adoption 
process, particular account must be taken of Maori interests and customary practice. The 
unique value placed upon cultural heritage, whanau participation in the upbringing of children, 
and the established custom of tamariki whangai combine to give greater emphasis to the need 
for legal recognition of Maori interests in adoption. 
A number of proposals have been made for ensuring that Maori children who are adopted are 
not alienated from their cultural heritage. Mark Henaghan has suggested that adoption be 
divided into two separate processes, with the issue of consent considered separately from the 
child's placement. In particular, this would involve whanau members contributing to the 
placement of the child, while the mother (and in some circumstances the father) retain the 
exclusive right to consent to the child's adoption.246 Another idea is for an extension of 
Section 11 of the Adoption Act, to allow cultural as well as religious conditions to be 
appended to adoption orders. Also, it has been proposed that the family group conference 
favoured under the Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 be extended to 
cover all custody and access proceedings.247 This latter suggestion prompts discussion of 
the two most persuasive aspects of the current debate in favour of Maori input into Maori 
245 Above n217, 129. 
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adoptions - the respective influences of the philosophy underlying the Children Young Persons 
and Their Families Act 1989, and of the Treaty of W aitangi. 
If Maori are to obtain a greater say in the adoption of their children, one of the arguments 
that may support their claim is the promise contained in Article Two of the Treaty of 
Waitangi that they can govern, among other things, their taonga - precious treasures. 
Children are often referred to as taonga.2A8 This argument was unsuccessfully used in R 
v R,2A9 where a Maori father argued that the Treaty of Waitangi gave him a superior right 
in a custody dispute. The argument was not accepted because the Treaty of Waitangi was not 
incorporated into the relevant legislation, the Guardianship Act 1968. This is also the case 
with the Adoption Act 1955. However, R v R, as well as "rais[ing] the cultural stakes too 
high for the court's liking",250 was an unfortunate case to first raise these issues in a family 
context in other respects.251 For instance, Graeme Austin has outlined a means by which 
the court could spell out of the Guardianship Act a requirement that the Treaty be considered, 
applying Cooke P's dictum on "ambiguous legislation" in New Zealand Maori CounciP2 
to the welfare principle.253 He then proceeds to point out the inherent difficulty in applying 
mainstream Treaty jurisprudence to family law.254 
One problem with applying this line of thinking to child custody law ... is that child custody law 
has already rejected much of mainstream legal thinking and reasoning. That Treaty 
jurisprudence mounts a challenge to mainstream legal doctrine may be largely irrelevant in an 
area of judicial activity that has itself said farewell to most of traditional legal reasoning 's 
confines. 
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Austin concludes his Treaty discussion with the salient point that: 
Before the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi to child custody disputes will be realised fully, 
the assumption that knowledge about children and their welfare exists in the abstract, untainted 
by the systems of thought that produced it, needs to be reassessed. 
The other line of thought that could prove to be persuasive when Maori input into adoption 
law is being considered is the approach taken up in the Children Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989. This statute is unique amongst family law statutes in New Zealand in its 
recognition and promotion of whanau participation in family decision-making. The challenge 
it makes to the traditional adoption paradigm has been noted on several occasions,255 and 
was specifically addressed in the 1990 report of the Adoption Practices Review Committee. 
The report asked two questions with regard to the influence of the Children Young Persons 
and Their Families Act.256 Firstly, to what extent should present adoption practices be 
modified to take account of the 1989 Act? Secondly, should a future reform of the law bring 
adoption under the 1989 Act? ln answering these questions, the report noted arguments for 
and against amalgamation.257 For instance, it was noted that adoption is essentially a matter 
of the care of children, thus inferring that consistency and uniformity in child care law are 
desirable. ln response, it was pointed out that other legislation also deals with child care, 
for instance the Guardianship Act. Also, it was noted that the 1989 Act reinforces the 
position that families should decide what is to happen to children, and supports the view that 
children should not normally be placed outside the family. In response, it was pointed out 
that a woman may have good reasons for not wanting her family's involvement and not 
wanting her child placed with her family, for instance, incest or violence. Two other points 
made against amalgamation were that the 1989 Act was still in its infancy and needed testing 
over time, and that the child's welfare is not paramount under the 1989 Act as it is under the 
255 See above n4, 200 and subsequent critique by G W Stewart "Review of A Questio11 of Adop1io11: Closed 
S1ra11ger Adop1io11 in New Zealand 1944 - 1974" (1992) 3 Frunily L Bulletin 54. 55; see also above n63. 
99. 
256 Above n29, 44. 
257 Above n29, 47. 
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Adoption Act. 258 In In the Adoption of 1259 Judge Inglis disputed that the child's welfare 
was not the paramount consideration in the 1989 Act, preferring instead his own interpretation 
of the Act which sees the paramountcy principle as inherent within the Act's provisions. 
However, Judge Inglis did concede that the considerable stress put on family input when 
resolving problems relating to a child under the 1989 Act gives rise to a clear danger that the 
child's interests may be downplayed by an overriding emphasis on family unity. 
In conclusion, the report took a stance against amalgamation. It recommended that birth 
parents should always be encouraged to involve family in decisions about adoption, but that 
whether to involve family should be up to the birth parents, and the family's opinion should 
still be subject to the birth mother's need to consent. 260 Despite this apparent reluctance 
to concede that adoption should be brought within the philosophy of the Children Young 
Persons and Their Families Act, it is still plausible that the 1989 Act will act as a constraint 
in certain adoption cases. For instance, given the 1989 Act's emphasis on the importance of 
family origins and the extended family, Family Court judges may be more hesitant in granting 
step-parent adoptions.261 
When discussing Maori participation in future adoption law reform, it is apt to note the 
development of adoption law in the United States with regard to the native American Indians, 
who have encountered many of the same difficulties as the Maori. Since 1978 adoption of 
Indian children in the United States has been governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 262 
The Act was motivated by the results of an investigation into how Indian children were faring 
under custody proceedings.263 It was discovered that social agencies and state courts were 
insensitive to traditional Indian values and patterns of childrearing. Like the Maori, Indians 
258 
Note that under the Children, Young Persons. and Their Families Amendment Bill I 993 it is proposed 
that s6 of the current Act be repealed, and in its place the welfare and interests of the child or young 
person shall be the first and paramount consideration. 
259 
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Joan Heifetz Hollinger "Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: the Indian Child Welfare Act and the 
Adoption of Indian Children" (1988/1989) 66 Uni of Detroit LR 451, 454. 
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preferred communal responsibility of children,264 yet social agencies and courts were 
insensitive to traditional Indian values and childrearing patterns, and were imposing upon 
them white, middle-class norms. These concerns are very similar to those expressed with 
regard to the adoption of Maori children under the New Zealand Adoption Act 1955. The 
Indian Child Welfare Act was designed to address these problems, recognizing that "the 
child's right to its identity and the tribal community's need to perpetuate its culture depend 
upon prevention of the child's removal from the tribal community".265 
The American Act utilizes a number of means for ensuring that American Indian children are 
not removed from their communities.266 It narrows the grounds for removing children from 
their parents, and increases the burden of proof that must be sustained by a party seeking to 
terminate parental rights. Tribal courts applying customary laws are used, or, if the 
proceedings take place in a state court, the child's tribe may have a right to intervene and to 
object to the prospective adopters. Preference is also mandated in favour of placements with 
the child's extended family, tribe, or other Indian families. The Act is guided by the dual 
goals of tribal survival and the welfare of the Indian child. However, although these goals 
were initially proclaimed to be harmonious, they are not proving to be so in practice. The 
massive removal of Indian children from traditional communities is continuing unabated,267 
due to widescale judicial resistance and the use of statutory exceptions under the Act. Despite 
the Act's laudable intentions, it is not succeeding in redressing the racial inequities of 
mainstream American adoption practice. Likewise it remains to be seen whether, if 
legislation was ever passed in New Zealand that accorded with Maori notions of childcare and 
adoption, it would actually achieve its desired outcome. 
VII Conclusion 
New Zealand's adoption law is not capable of effectively meeting the diverse and conflicting 
264 Donna J Goldsmith "Individual versus Collective Rights: the Indian Child Welfare Act" (1990) 13 
Harvard Women's U 1, I. 
265 Above n264, 2. 
266 See above n263. 
267 Above n264, 4. 
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needs of people involved in step-parent and intra-family adoption, be they the child, the birth 
parents, adoptive parents, step-parent, family members or significant others concerned for the 
child. A number of options are available if something is to be done to address this current 
inadequacy. 
Firstly, step-parent and intra-family adoption could be prohibited under the Adoption Act 
1955, in recognition of how confusing the distortion of family relationships can be for the 
child, or of how destructive to a child's self-identity it can be for all legal recourse to be lost 
to the child's alienated natural parent, extended family and cultural heritage. This dramatic 
option is likely to persuade only those who would happily abolish adoption as a whole,268 
given that it disregards those situations where a step-parent or intra-family adoption will 
genuinely further the welfare and interests of the child. This may be the case if, for instance, 
the step-child has only ever known its step-father as a father figure, and has had little or no 
contact with its paternal extended family. 269 It may also be the case if, as in Re Adoption 
of Q110 a grandmother who has cared for her grandchild since birth does not wish the 
natural mother to care for the child for fear of the harm that the natural mother's new 
husband may inflict on the child. 
If there is going to be talk of abolishing step-parent and intra-family adoption, it is likely to 
be conditional upon exceptions in certain circumstances. Those circumstances are likely to 
be similar to those outlined above, where there is a manifest need for the security and 
permanence of an adoption order. Rather than expressing this option in the negative -
abolishing step-parent and intra-family adoption - it would be more constructive to look upon 
it as the retention of these forms of adoption, subject to the consideration of alternatives. 
This is in effect the current law in Tasmania and Victoria. It was also the law in the United 
Kingdom, with regard to step-parent adoption only, prior to the enactment of the Children Act 
1989, whereupon it was repealed as a consequence of its failure to decrease the proportion 
of step-parent adoptions. This option does attempt to grapple with the inherent dilemma in 
step-parent and intra-family adoption, that although adoption may be deemed as unsuitable 
268 For instance, see above n56. 
269 See above n 185. 
270 See above n133. 
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in the circumstances, some form of legal order may nonetheless be required to address the 
applicants' concerns. However, a regime such as this that is essentially opposed to step-
parent and intra-family adoption is too inflexible and polarized to successfully meet, or even 
attempt to meet, the parties' varied and contrasting needs and desires. 
The most plausible means for achieving this objective is by retaining step-parent and intra-
family adoption under the Adoption Act, but allowing for a nuanced and flexible legal regime 
of alternative or supplementary orders, as has been implemented under the Children Act 1989 
and as is proposed under the White Paper in the United Kingdom. Legal orders which, in 
appropriate circumstances, allow adults contact with children, or which confer parental status 
upon adults, or which determine with whom the child shall reside on a day-to-day basis are 
advantageous in several respects. They allow the child to retain and foster relationships with 
various adults. This avoids the notion of parenthood as involving exclusive rights and 
possessions, and allows the focus to change to the responsibilities invoked by parenthood.271 
It also involves rethinking familiar concepts of family. 272 The 1990 report of the Adoption 
Practices Review Committee expressed particular interest in the new British notion of 
parenthood, under which duties and responsibilities are assumed, as compared to the idea that 
parents acquire children at the expense of other people in the child's life.273 
New Zealand is most likely to resolve the current inadequacy of its law regarding step-parent 
and intra-family adoption if it implements an adoption regime that conforms in general to the 
current and proposed United Kingdom amendments. Not only would such a development pay 
tribute to the array of concerns that these situations involve, but it would also address the 
broader issue of "open" adoption, given that an adoption order supplemented with a contact 
order under the Children Act creates a legally mandated form of open adoption.274 By 
271 See above n151, 21, and Katherine T Bartlett "Re-Expressing Parenthood" (1988) 98 Yale LJ 293. See 
also Karen Czapanskiy "Volunteers and Draftees: the Struggle for Parental Equality" (1991) 38 UCLA 
LR 1415, 1466, wherein the author expresses the concern that a focus on responsibility may ignore the 
adults' inter-relationship which inevitably impacts upon the welfare of the child. 
272 See Naomi R Cahn "Family Issue(s)" (1994) 61 Uni of Chicago LR 325. 
273 Above n29, 74. 
274 The provision of "open" adoption in appropriate circumstances, be they step-parent, intra-family or other 
adoptions, is preferable to the enactment of a mandatory open adoption scheme. which by definition 
denies those situations where open familial relationships may be entirely inappropriate; see above n 13. 
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incorporating a range of innovative and comprehensive legal orders, New Zealand's adoption 
law will be better able to give cases the individualized and sensitive treatment they so often 
demand. 
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